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Abstract 
This thesis uses firm-level data from the crisis-hit economies (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) to examine the characteristics 
of firms targeted by foreign investors in cross-border M&A. This study attempts to 
assess differences in the firm-level characteristics of firms targeted by foreign 
acquisitions and domestic acquisitions. These characteristics include corporate 
liquidity, various financial characteristics and more importantly, the corporate 
governance quality of targets. Using either panel or cross-section data, we find that 
target firms are characterized by low liquidity, high investment opportunity and high 
ROE, which is consistent with the view that cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
during the crisis involve fire sale. 
Furthermore, using cross-section data, we find that target firms are characterized 
by a low level of control rights or being less effectively controlled by large 
shareholders or managers. More importantly, the role of ownership structure is more 
important in the likelihood of acquisition when liquidity is taken into account. 
Liquidity and ownership structures have an interactive effect on the likelihood of 
foreign acquisitions. We find that domestic cash-tightened firms with a low degree of 
the separation of control rights and cash flow rights are more likely to be targeted by 
foreign firms. 
Overall, our results suggest that firms that signal bright fundamentals but with 
low liquidity become more attractive targets in the influx of cross-border M&A at 
dawn of the financial crisis. This thesis contributes to the literature by offering more 
evidence regarding fire-sale M&A during the Asian financial crisis. Furthermore, this 
thesis adds to our understanding of the importance of corporate governance in the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s, we have witnessed a tidal wave of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A)^ in Asia, particularly in the five countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) hit by the financial turmoil. The total 
value of cross-border M&A in the five crisis-hit countries jumped from an annual 
average of US$ 3.5 billion during the pre-crisis years of 1995-1996 to an annual 
average of US$ 17.3 billion during the crisis years of 1998-1999 (Figure 1)^ thanks to 
the important changes in government policies following the outbreak of the financial 
turmoil. The transaction values of cross-border M&A in the crisis-stricken countries 
reached a peak of US$ 17.40 billion in 1998, climbing up from US$ 3.35 billion in 
1996, whereas the deal values of domestic M&A sharply declined from US$ 14.46 
billion in 1996 to US$ 9.45 billion in 1998. 
It is also interesting to note that foreign direct investment (FDI) in the form of 
mergers and acquisitions surged during the financial crisis, whereas simultaneously 
there was a dramatic fall in portfolio investments (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2003)�. 
Furthermore, the share of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in FDI inflows to the 
five crisis-stricken countries in 1998 was over 60 percent (Ozawa and Zhan, 2001). If 
a Cross-border M&A is defined as the acquisitions of domestic firms (from the five crisis-hit 
economies) by foreign firms (from non-crisis economies). 
b Figure 1 reports the transaction values of completed deals. Different figures are reported by 
UNCTAD (2000), and cited by Ozawa and Zhan (2001)，but the trends are similar, 
e Aguiar and Gopinath (2003) compare the flows of inward FDI and portfolio investments in figure 1. 
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the sharp reversals in portfolio flows reflected the confidence crisis triggered by the 
Asian financial crisis and the slump in stock markets, would cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions be more likely to target undervalued firms with good fundamentals to 
shield from confidence crisis? What are the driving forces for the surge in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions under confidence-depressed circumstances? 
What is the behavior of cross-border M&A in unstable period? Are there any special 
characteristics? 
In this thesis, we examine the financial and governance characteristics of 
domestic firms targeted by foreign firms during the Asian financial crisis. The Asian 
financial crisis offers a platform to examine the behavior of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions during the economic crisis period. First, we witness the influx of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions during the crisis. We particularly focus on 
mergers and acquisitions that happened in 1998, when most of domestic firms 
suffered a liquidity crisis and were in financial distress. Aguiar and Gopinath (2003) 
also define the crisis period as the year of 1998a. Second, agency problem, which is a 
key element of corporate governance, is prevalent in emerging markets (Lemmon and 
Lins, 2003). Corporate governance can account for the huge loss of confidence by 
foreign investors in a period of crisis, thus can explain a sudden reversal of capital 
a The reason for the definition of crisis period is provided by Aguiar and Gopinath (2003). 
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inflow and the slump in stock market (Johnson et al., 2000). A fall in foreign capital 
inflows in the crisis-stricken economies can be attributed to a loss of confidence and 
poor corporate governance, which is a symptom of ineffective legal institutions and 
poor investor protections. Johnson et al. (2000) focus on differences in legal 
institutions for corporate governance across countries. They argue that countries with 
weak corporate governance are more vulnerable to suffer a big loss of investor 
confidence. In this thesis, we argue that firms with weak corporate governance are 
more vulnerable to a loss of confidence by foreign investors, thereby less likely to 
obtain the injection of foreign capital. In circumstances of financial distress, foreign 
investors are more aware of the financial situation of target firms as well as the 
quality of corporate governance. 
The influx of cross-border M&A during a period of economic distress could be 
closely associated with the outbreak of the financial turmoil. In the aftermath of the 
financial turmoil, two typical problems plagued domestic firms. First, the financial 
crisis resulted in most of domestic firms suffering a severe shortage of liquidity. They 
were threatened with going bankrupt (Ozawa and Zhan, 2001). Given the depressed 
domestic financial markets and the lack of domestic finance, cross-border M&A 
served as an important source of liquidity available to cash-strapped firms (Ozawa 
and Zhan, 2001). Second, domestic firms are plagued with ever-aggravated corporate 
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governance problems, such as underreported losses, understated liabilities and 
inefficient management. Foreign firms could bring in superior technology, advanced 
management, international standards of accounting and corporate governance 
framework that were lacking in the five crisis-stricken countries (Ozawa and Zhan, 
2001). Thus, cross-border M&A not only have provided some relief for domestic 
firms in financial distress with the injection of capital, but also could be perceived as a 
helpful device to improve corporate governance of domestic firms. 
From the perspective of foreign investors, financial crisis offered a favorable 
platform for foreign firms to make acquisitions in the crisis-stricken countries. 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are stepping stones for foreign firms to gain 
access to emerging markets. First, the cost of acquisitions declined during the crisis 
due to constrained options of distressed local firms. Aguiar and Gopinath (2003) find 
that offering price is positively associated with the liquidity of firms. Furthermore, 
cash-tightened firms were faced with a choice between being acquired and going 
bankrupt. Foreign investors could purchase domestic firms in financial distress at 
bargain prices without strong resistance. Second, in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, the asset values of domestic firms dropped precipitously as a result of the 
slump in stock markets, which were likely to be far away below their real values 
(Chen and Findlay, 2003). Foreign investors could take advantage of the depressed 
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markets by taking over undervalued firms. Thirdly, the governments in the crisis-hit 
countries brought in the important policies that included the liberalization of trade and 
investment regimes, the deregulation of the services sector, the large scale 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, the introduction of international accounting 
standards and the relaxation of controls over cross-border M&A (Chen and Findlay 
(2003), Mody and Negishi (2001), and UNCTAD (2000)). With the relaxation of 
various measures, cross-border M&A become more likely and more feasible to occur. 
Nonetheless, a huge wave of cross-border M&A triggered by the Asian financial 
crisis has not received much attention in the literature. The behavior of cross-border 
M&A in emerging markets has not been studied in detail, although there is a rich 
literature on the nature of M&A in developed countries. The most relevant work, 
which is conducted by Aguiar, and Gopinath (2003), is an attempt to address the surge 
in cross-border M&A that occurred in a period of the crisis from a liquidity 
perspective. They investigate the relationship between a liquidity crisis triggered by 
the Asian financial crisis and the surge in foreign mergers and acquisitions by using 
firm-level data from the five crisis-hit countries. They document that liquidity has a 
prominent role to play in explaining the rapid increase in cross-border M&A during 
the crisis, but not in other economies and not in normal periods. They find that firms 
with high cash flow reduce the likelihood of being acquired by foreign investors, 
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whereas high capital expenditure has a positive effect on the likelihood of foreign 
acquisitions. 
Our work is closely related to the prior research conducted by Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2003). In a follow-up to their early work, we investigate differences in the 
various financial characteristics of firms targeted by foreign investors and those not. 
We extend previous research by examining the effects of operating performance on 
the desirability of cross-border M&A, which reinforces the claim that cross-border 
M&A during the crisis involved “fire sale" (Krugman, 1998). More deeply, this study 
taps into a new area by investigating the governance characteristics of firms targeted 
by foreign firms, thus identifying the role played by corporate governance in the 
influx of cross-border M&A during the crisis. Besides, this thesis takes a deep 
approach by examining the interactive effects between liquidity and governance on 
the likelihood of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Our work is related to the growing literature on the relation between corporate 
governance and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
investigate the effects of differences in legal systems and regulatory enforcement 
across countries on cross-border mergers and acquisitions. They document that 
differences in corporate governance across countries can explain the behavior of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. They find that firms in countries with weaker 
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investor protection are more likely to be targets while those in countries with stronger 
protection become acquirers. They focus on differences in legal systems and 
accounting standards across countries. In this thesis, we focus on differences in 
ownership structures across firms in the five crisis-hit countries. We employ the 
measures of corporate governance that vary at the firm level to explain the behavior of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions during the crisis. 
There is an abundance of literature on the effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance, while few papers have specially addressed the role of corporate 
governance in a huge wave of cross-border M&A in emerging markets during a 
financial crisis. More recently a number of studies, such as Claessens, Djankov, Fan 
and Lang (2002), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) (2000， 
2002), Mitton (2002), and Lemmon and Lins (2003) have investigated the impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance. Mitton (2002) finds that firms with high 
disclosure quality or with high ownership concentration are associated with better 
performance in stock prices at the time of the financial crisis, whereas corporate 
diversification is associated with worse performance in stock price by using firm-level 
data from the five crisis-hit countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South 
Korea, and Thailand). Lemmon and Lins (2003) argue that the Asian financial crisis 
has aggravated the problem of corporate governance because the crisis led to a 
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deterioration of the firms' investment opportunities, thereby accelerating the 
incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Lemmon 
and Lins (2003) find that cumulative stock returns of firms with greater separation of 
control rights and cash flow rights are lower during the crisis compared to those of 
other firms by using data from 800 firms in eight East Asian countries. Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) provide more evidence in support of entrenchment 
hypothesis. They find that a greater separation of control rights from cash flow rights 
held by the largest shareholder is associated with more severe expropriation and 
poorer firm's performance during the crisis. 
As described above, a number of studies document that corporate governance has 
a significant impact on firm performance during the crisis. Nonetheless, the role 
played by corporate governance in a huge wave of cross-border M&A, during the 
financial crisis, has not achieved much attention. Since corporate governance plays a 
significant role in the crisis, corporate governance should explain not just firm 
performance, but also has crucial implications for the behavior of cross-border M&A. 
Nonetheless, few studies have specially addressed mergers and acquisitions that 
occurred in confidence-depressed circumstances. This thesis fills this gap by 
incorporating the crisis effects on the surge in cross-border M&A. This thesis also 
attempts to fill the gap in the M&A literature by examining the effect of corporate 
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governance variables on the influx of cross-border M&A in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. We question whether firms that are undervalued are more likely to 
become attractive targets in the influx of cross-border M&A at dawn of the financial 
crisis. We also investigate whether the targets are typically from firms with good 
corporate governance in the crisis-stricken countries during the crisis. We examine the 
governance characteristics of firms targeted by foreign acquisitions under the crisis 
circumstances. This thesis contributes to literature by offering more evidence in 
support of the claim of “fire sale". Furthermore, this thesis adds to our understanding 
of the importance of corporate governance in the influx of cross-border M&A during 
the crisis. This thesis also contributes to the literature by adding to our understanding 
of the behavior of cross-border M&A during the crisis. 
Using panel data of both target firms and non-target firms from the five crisis-hit 
countries, we find that domestic firms that are acquired by foreign firms tend to have 
a lower level of liquidity, as compared to those without being involved in foreign 
acquisitions, which is consistent with the view that liquidity has a crucial role to play 
in foreign acquisitions during the crisis (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2003).Our results also 
show that target firms are associated with high ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets and high growth rate in sales, which is consistent with the findings of Aguiar 
and Gopinath (2003), who argue that foreign acquirers target domestic firms with 
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more productivity and bright growth prospect. Furthermore, our results complement 
their results by finding that firms with high ROE or ROA are more likely to become 
the targets of foreign acquisitions under the crisis circumstances. This is inconsistent 
with the conventional view that target firms are typically poorly performing firms. 
More importantly, we also investigate the effects of ownership structures on 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions using cross-section data in the five crisis-hit 
economies during the crisis. Our results show that the target firms are typically 
associated with a low level of control rights held by the largest bolckholder. Firms 
that are effectively controlled by large shareholders or managers are less likely to be 
acquired. We find that firms with low liquidity and low degree of the separation of 
control rights and cash flow rights are more likely to become the targets of foreign 
acquisitions. The probability of acquisitions is low when large shareholders 
effectively control the cash-rich firms, whereas the probability of acquisitions is high 
when large shareholders less effectively control the firms and are cash-constrained. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. We review the literature on the 
financial and governance characteristics of target firms in chapter 2. In next chapter, 
we formulate a number of hypotheses on the characteristics of target firms. We derive 
testable implications for the behavior of cross-border mergers and acquisitions that 
occurred in the crisis year. Chapter 4 is devoted to the construction of the sample and 
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a description of the variables used. The empirical results on the financial 
characteristics of target firms obtained from the logit estimates are presented in 
chapter 5 while chapter 6 reports the regression results with respect to the governance 
characteristics of target firms using cross-section data. We discuss additional tests in 
chapter 7. The final chapter draws conclusions with a review of the main findings. 
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Chapter 2 Literature 
2.1 The Financial Characteristics of Target Firms 
There is a substantial and growing literature on the financial characteristics of 
likely target firms prior to being taken over. A number of studies^, such as those of 
Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Comment and 
Schwert (1995) and Shivdasani (1993) have used accounting measures of 
performance in an attempt to explore the financial characteristics of target firms prior 
to acquisitions. These analyses based on accounting information have provided mixed 
results. Hasbrouck (1985) investigates the characteristics of takeover targets using 
control groups matched by size or industry. He finds that market-to-book ratio and 
firm size have negative impacts on the desirability of a takeover, while liquidity and 
leverage do not have significant effects on the probability of a takeover. The 
significant and negative coefficient on market-to-book ratio indicates that firms run 
by inefficient management are more likely to become takeover targets. Similarly, 
Palepu (1986) provides logit estimates based on a sample of 163 targets and 256 
non-targets. He finds that sales growth, leverage and size are negatively related to the 
likelihood of a takeover, whereas ROE, market-to-book ratio, price-earnings ratio and 
liquidity do not matter. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) estimate a probit model 
a Details on a review of previous studies on the financial characteristics of target firms are provided by 
Schwert G. W. (page 2620, 2000). 
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that consists of 82 targets and 372 non-targets from Fortune-500 firms. They find that 
a hostile target is associated with a lower Tobin's Q while a friendly target is 
associated with a high Tobin's Q. Shivdasani (1993) uses a choice-based sample 
consisting of 193 hostile targets and 194 non-targets from 1980 to 1988 to estimate a 
logit model. He finds that firm size as well as Tobin's Q ratio (market-to-book ratio) 
is negatively associated with the probability of a hostile takeover, while leverage, 
undistributed cash flow and sales growth do not have significant effects on the 
likelihood of a hostile takeover. Comment and Schwert (1995) use a large sample to 
investigate the financial characteristics of target firms. They find that only the 
coefficient on firm size is significant and negative while other explanatory variables 
do not matter. 
These studies have provided a consistent prediction of size effect on the 
probability of acquisitions. However, Schwert (2000) finds that large size tends to 
increase the likelihood of a takeover. The studies, as described above, also have 
provided some evidence in support of "inefficient management hypothesis" (Palepu, 
1986), but the evidence is weak and mixed. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of these studies on various characteristics of 
target firms have been criticized for the inappropriate methodology (Palepu, 1986) as 
they have placed relatively high levels of discrimination between acquired firms and 
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non-acquired firms using financial data. For instance, the use of non-random samples 
(the number of acquired firms equal to the number of non-acquired firms) results in 
inconsistent and biased estimates of the parameters. The use of non-random samples 
also leads to overstating the predictive power of the model. Palepu (1986) finds a low 
predictive power for his model when correcting for these methodological problems. 
Aguiar and Gopinath (2003) use a large random sample and panel data to 
investigate whether liquidity plays a significant role in affecting the probability of 
acquisitions in emerging markets during the crisis. They find that target firms are 
typically associated with low liquidity but high investment opportunities in the 
crisis-hit economies during the crisis, but not in the non-crisis-hit economies and 
non-crisis years. Liquidity is negatively associated with the probability of acquisitions 
during the crisis while good growth opportunity is positively related to the probability 
of acquisitions. 
There is an abundance of literature that directly addresses the disciplinary role of 
takeovers, also known as "inefficient management hypothesis" (Palepu (1986), 
Agrawal and Jaffe (2003)). A number of studies have investigated the relation 
between operating performance and the probability of acquisitions. However, the 
evidence on inefficient management hypothesis is mixed. ROE is positively but 
insignificantly associated with the likelihood of takeovers (Palepu (1986), Song and 
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Walking (1993)).There is no sufficient evidence to support the claim that target firms 
are underperforming before acquisitions (Agrawal and Jaffe (2003))� 
2.2 Agency Problems in Emerging Markets 
The characteristics of agency costs in emerging markets are somewhat different 
from the ones in developed countries. The typical agency problems in developed 
countries with good investor protection, such as U.S. and U.K.，are characterized by 
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Berle and Means (1932), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)), whereas in emerging markets the conflict of interest 
between controlling shareholders (or managers) and minority shareholders is more 
prevalent (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). In developed economies, 
managers pursue objectives that are at odds with those interests of shareholders (Berle 
and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976)). An increase in concentrated 
ownership can enhance the effectiveness of monitoring management and mitigate 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986)). 
Unlike the earlier views. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) suggest 
that large publicly traded firms in emerging markets are not as widely held as those in 
a A detailed review of the literature regarding the role of disciplinary takeovers is provided by Agrawal 
and Jaffe (2003) "Appendix: The Disciplinary Motive for Takeovers一A Review of the Empirical 
Evidence". 
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developed economies, but are effectively controlled by large shareholders. Controlling 
shareholders, who are entrenched themselves, have incentives to expropriate minority 
shareholders through the use of pyramids. With closely held firms, large shareholders 
effectively controlling the board of directors sideline the small investors and reap a 
huge amount of private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Unlike U.S. and other developed economies, more concentrated ownership held 
by controlling shareholders potentially creates large agency costs in emerging market. 
Agency problems in emerging markets have attracted plenty of attention (Lemmon 
and Lins (2003), Lins (2003)). The agency problems in emerging markets are more 
severe than the ones in developed countries (Bebchuk, 1999). First, in East Asian 
companies, large shareholders are usually involved with management. Claessens et al” 
(2000) find that 60% of closely held firms in nine Asian economies have an affiliation 
between controlling shareholders and management. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999) suggest that controlling shareholders also engage in management 
through the use of pyramids. Controlling shareholders affiliated with management are 
unlikely to have common interests with minority shareholders (Mitton (2002), and 
Lins (2003)). The affiliation between shareholders and management as well as the 
managerial entrenchment gives rise to agency problems. Mitton (2002) documents 
that large shareholders affiliated with managers were more likely to engage in 
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expropriation of minority shareholders during the crisis because the crisis depressed 
the investment opportunity of firms (Lemon and Lins，2003). 
Alternatively, agency problems in emerging markets could also attribute to the 
separation of control and ownership. The separation of control and ownership, as 
measured by control rights in excess of cash flow rights, is prevalent in emerging 
markets. Control is obtained through pyramid structures as well as cross-holding 
(Claessens et al. (2000)，Lins (2003)). The private benefits of control through highly 
concentrated ownership are large in countries with underdeveloped capital markets 
and weak investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998, 1999), 
Dyck and Zingales (2004)). A blockholder with a high level of control rights but 
holding relatively few cash flow rights is more likely to extract large private benefits, 
and expropriate minority shareholders (Bebchuk (1999), and Lins (2003)). For 
example, managers or controlling shareholders who have control rights in excess of 
cash flow rights can potentially expropriate outside minority investors by transferring 
firm resources to their own use or consuming perquisites such as corporate jets and 
plush offices that provide private benefits (Lemon and Lins, 2003). This managerial 
entrenchment would be more likely to reduce firm values. 
2.3 The Ownership Characteristics of Target Firms 
There is a growing literature on the nature and the behavior of M&A that 
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occurred in developed countries, such as U.S. and U.K. The M&A, particularly a 
hostile takeover, is perceived as an effective device for improving corporate 
governance and "shaking up” inefficient or under-performing firms (Cooper and 
Gregory, 2000). The takeovers are categorized by hostile and friendly. The major 
distinction between hostile and friendly is based on whether management resists the 
takeover bid. There is a consensus that poorly performing firms associated with 
ineffective corporate governance are more likely to be takeover targets. The image of 
the market for corporate control, originally advanced by Manne (1965), indicates that 
a takeover serves as a disciplinary role to exert external pressure on management if 
internal corporate governance mechanism fails. Takeover is perceived as an effective 
device to alleviate the agency costs and replace inefficient management (Cooper and 
Gregory, 2000). 
To the best of our knowledge, the research on the behavior of M&A made in 
emerging markets is somewhat limited. Nevertheless, a number of studies have 
investigated the ownership and governance characteristics of target firms in developed 
economies. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) suggest that the hostile takeover is 
more likely to be disciplinary, whereas the friendly one is more likely to be synergistic. 
For hostile takeovers, firms with higher officer ownership have a lower the likelihood 
of being acquired, whereas in friendly takeovers, firms with larger officer ownership 
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are more likely to be acquired. 
Shivdasani (1993) examines the governance characteristics of target firms with 
the use of a choice-based sample consisting of 193 targets and 194 non-targets. He 
argues that the quality of corporate governance，in the form of ownership 
characteristics have a significant effect on corporate performance and thus play an 
important role in the takeover wave of the 1980’s. There exist suboptimal governance 
structures leading to poor corporate performance and thereby raising the desirability 
of a takeover. In other words, firms that are subject to hostile takeovers are likely to 
be associated with imderperformance and poor corporate governance. 
He finds that high managerial ownership reduces the probability of a hostile 
takeover. Weisbach (1993) provides some reasons behind that firms with high 
management ownership are less likely to be acquired. First, firms with larger 
managerial ownership are less vulnerable to suffering from agency costs, which 
would mean better corporate governance and performance, and thus less likely to gain 
by replacing management. Second, managers who possess more shares have an 
incentive to take effective resistance against the potential acquirers, thus increasing 
the cost of a takeover and reducing the likelihood of a takeover. 
Furthermore, Shivdasani (1993) finds that increased ownership by affiliated 
blockholders decreases the probability of a takeover, while increased ownership by 
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unaffiliated blockholders increases the probability of a takeover. Weisbach (1993) 
provides insights into the effect of governance characteristics on the likelihood of a 
takeover. He argues that firms with suboptimal governance structures perform poorly 
and thus are more likely to become takeover targets. 
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses 
This chapter presents key hypotheses that can explain the characteristics of target 
firms as well as the behavior of cross-border M&A during the crisis. The hypotheses 
are on the basis of the theories in the M&A literature rather than the function of 
statistical significance. We derive testable predictions from the literature regarding the 
nature and the behavior of M&A. Our hypotheses mainly focus on the behavior of 
foreign mergers and acquisitions in a period of crisis where little literature has 
specified and addressed. We not only distinguish between foreign acquisitions and 
domestic acquisitions, but also distinguish mergers and acquisitions that occurred in 
the crisis year of 1998 and that occurred in other periods. Under the circumstance of 
financial distress, foreign investors are more aware of the financial situation as well as 
the quality of corporate governance of target firms. Thus, our work belongs to the 
growing arguments, but also somewhat differs in important aspects. 
We formulate a number of hypotheses on the basis of important assumptions. 
The fundamental assumption of our hypotheses is that financial markets in emerging 
economies are not only underdeveloped, but also inefficient. In the absence of 
efficient stock markets, firms' assets are valued inappropriately^. In contrast, foreign 
“Shleifer and Vishny (2003) construct a model to explain acquisitions driven by market misevaluation. 
In their model, they assume that firms are misevaluated by stock markets due to inefficient financial 
markets while managers who are informed and rational take advantage of arbitrage, driving the wave of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
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investors or acquirers who come from developed countries are rational and take 
advantage of the inefficiency in emerging markets. Once the Asian financial crisis 
unfolded, firms' market values dropped precipitously, which were more likely to be 
far away below their real values. Foreign investors snapped up corporate assets at 
bargain prices by taking advantage of distressed markets. 
Firms with undervalued assets become attractive takeover targets as their stock 
prices are typically undervalued relative to their real values. As suggested by Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003), acquirers search for targets that are undervalued by the markets. A 
number of studies, such as Kaplan (1989), Bhagat et al. (1990), and Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) document that firms undervalued by the markets are likely to become 
the targets of the 1980s takeovers. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) also argue that firms 
with undervalued equity become targets of takeover and targets involved in cash 
acquisitions are undervalued relative to their fundamentals. 
There is a possibility that undervalued firms during the crisis are more likely to 
be the candidates of foreign acquisitions since they signal strong fundamentals and 
bright prospect. This prediction is consistent with the view of "fire sale" (Krugman, 
1998). As argued by Krugman (1998), cross-border M&A activities during the crisis 
involve "fire sale", which refer to the rapid acquisitions of firms’ assets at depressed 
prices. On the eve of the financial crisis, the asset values of firms were driven up by a 
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boom in stock markets. Notwithstanding, in the aftermath of the financial turmoil, 
with the bursting of bubble, the crisis-stricken countries have witnessed a slump in 
stock markets�which eroded firms' asset values. Firms with comparative corporate 
governance or favorable fimdamentals could hardly escape from this catastrophic 
disaster. The crisis provided golden opportunities for foreign investors to rapidly 
acquire cash-strapped domestic firms at depressed prices without strong resistance. 
The market values of firms slumped and extraordinarily deviated from their 
fundamental values as a result of the plunge in stock markets. This lured the influx of 
cross-border M&A. Thus, firms with strong fundamentals were more likely to be 
acquired at depressed prices because foreign investors remained relatively optimistic 
about the prospect that a revival would be on its way sooner or later. 
3.1 The Financial Characteristics of Likely Targets 
Liquidity Hypothesis 
Most of domestic firms in the five crisis-stricken countries plunged into a 
liquidity crisis during the period of economic downturn, of which large shareholders 
were cash-strapped and in need of capital. Domestic firms in financial distress 
urgently needed injection of both fresh capital and new managerial skills to survive, 
either foreign or domestic (Ozawa and Zhan，2001). Nonetheless, distressed firms 
a The sharp drop in stock price together with the dramatic devaluation in the crisis period may imply 
that the offering price may be lower than in normal period. 
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could hardly be acquired and financed by other domestic firms since the latter were in 
equally dire circumstances of financial distress. The source of liquidity available to 
distressed firms was rare in a distress period. First, domestic banks, which were also 
severely hit by the currency crisis, were plagued with enormous amounts of 
non-performing loans, or even became insolvent (Ozawa and Zhan, 2001). Their asset 
position continuously aggravated as a result of the slump in stock markets. Thus, they 
lost their capacity to release funds to firms in a shortage of capital. Second, it was 
impossible for domestic firms to raise funds from the depressed domestic financial 
markets, which were associated with the plunge in stock markets. Meanwhile, 
domestic firms suffering a liquidity crisis failed to obtain any sources of capital from 
international financial markets as their credit rating deteriorated. Thus, in the absence 
of foreign finance, given the credit deterioration and the depressed domestic financial 
markets, the only viable option left for liquidity-strapped firms was to sell corporate 
assets to foreign investors at low prices to alleviate a liquidity crisis through M&A 
deals. 
Cash-rich firms are less vulnerable to takeovers because affluent cash is an 
effective and valuable weapon in deterring acquisition attempts (Harford, 1999). For 
instance, firms with affluent cash are more likely to repurchase their shares than other 
firms, and thus can shield from takeovers (Harford, 1999). Hence, an attempt to 
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acquire cash-rich firms involves large costs but small profits. Furthermore, the 
financial crisis resulted in most firms suffering a liquidity crisis and falling short of 
funds. Hereby, we argue that target firms are cash-strapped, indicating that firms with 
low liquidity raise the desirability of cross-border M&A. This is consistent with the 
view of a liquidity crisis. As documented by Aguiar and Gopinath (2003), liquidity 
has a prominent role to play in explaining the influx of foreign M&A in the five 
crisis-stricken economies, but not in non-crisis economies. We extend their analysis 
by incorporating undervaluation effect and provide more comprehensive evidence, in 
support of liquidity hypothesis. 
Efficiency Hypothesis 
The inefficient management hypothesis (Palepu，1986) states that firms run by 
inefficient management would be more likely to be taken over for the replacement of 
the inefficient management and the improvement of operating performance, indicating 
that poorly performing firms are more vulnerable to acquisitions. A number of studies 
have used ROE or ROA as a proxy for management performance to address the 
inefficient management hypothesis (Palepu (1986), Song and Walking (1993)). 
However, as mentioned in the literature, there is a lack of significance between ROE 
and the likelihood of acquisitions in their studies. 
In this thesis, we argue that firms with more efficient corporate management are 
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more likely to be acquired. First, high ROE signals a good fundamental of a firm, and 
serves as an indicator of efficient operation, which gives confidence to foreign 
investors under confidence-depressed circumstances. In contrast, poorly performing 
firms, as evidenced by low ROE, are associated with inefficient management and 
sub-optimal corporate governance, which is less attractive in an extreme environment 
of confidence loss. Second, high ROE is a sign of efficient management and good 
corporate governance. Foreign firms may find it easier to operate the firms with 
efficient management in the post-acquisition era. 
Growth Hypothesis 
To complement liquidity hypothesis, we argue that cash-tightened firms with 
high growth prospects are more attractive for acquirers. Firms with affluent cash but 
few investment opportunities are more likely to be acquirers while firms with 
insufficient cash but good investment opportunity may seek out mergers with 
cash-rich firms, thus are more likely to be targets (Smith and Kim (1994), Harford 
(1999)). 
As suggested by Aguiar and Gopinath (2003), firms with high investment 
opportunity, as measured by logarithm of capital expenditure, are positively 
associated with the probability of acquisitions because they will raise the surplus of 
acquisitions. This is consistent with the finding of Aitken and Harrison (1999) that 
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foreign acquirers target domestic firms with high productivity relative to those non-
targets. Furthermore, firms with more capital expenditure are associated with more 
productivity and signal strong prospect. 
3.2 Ownership Structure Characteristics and Takeovers 
There are ambiguous effects of ownership structures on the likelihood of 
acquisitions. On the one hand, firms with more concentrated ownership are more 
likely to transfer controls (Grossman and Hart, 1980). More concentrated ownership 
in the form of block shareholding can mitigate the free-rider problem (Grossman and 
Hart, 1980). More concentrated ownership can lessen the cost of monitoring and 
overcome the free-rider problem, thereby facilitating friendly takeovers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). It could be the case that large shareholders can "facilitate third-party 
takeovers by sharing gains with the bidder" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In contrast 
with more concentrated ownership, diffuse ownership aggravates free-rider problem 
in takeover by forcing bidder to pay a higher takeover premium than otherwise, 
thereby acting as a disincentive for takeovers (Grossman and Hart (1980), Rossi and 
Volpin (2004)). 
On the other hand, under highly concentrated ownership, the private benefits of 
control are high, implying that the market for corporate control is relatively less 
effective because incumbents will attempt to entrench themselves through 
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maintaining their control and takeover defensive measures. Large private benefits of 
control (Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales (2004)) are associated with highly 
concentrated ownership (Bebchuk, 1999) and less active market for corporate control 
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004). In contrast, diffuse ownership is associated with low private 
benefits of control and a more active market for transfers of corporate control (Rossi 
and Volpin, 2004). As suggested by Barclay, Holdemess, and Pontiff (1991), and 
Weisbach (1993), blockholders who extract an enormous amount of private benefits 
from controlling a company have an incentive to resist potential acquirers. 
Blockholders involved with management could derive enormous private benefits and 
make transfers of control more difficult (Weisbach, 1993). Furthermore, a high 
premium needs to compensate large shareholders at expense of large private benefits 
(relinquishment of control and large private benefits), thus hindering the takeovers. 
Increased ownership concentration can facilitate acquisitions by mitigating 
free-rider problem. It also can deter acquisitions by facilitating entrenchment and 
increasing the cost of acquisitions. Whether increased ownership facilitates 
acquisitions or deters feasible acquisitions is largely determined by the affiliation 
between large shareholders and managers. As mentioned in the literature, the 
probability of a takeover is positively associated with ownership by large shareholders 
unaffiliated with management while it is negatively associated with ownership by 
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large shareholders affiliated with management. 
In East Asian countries, many firms that are closely held have controlling 
shareholders affiliated with management. Furthermore, there's a large wedge between 
voting rights and cash flows of controlling shareholders. As argued by Dyck and 
Zingales (2004), higher private benefits of control are associated with more 
concentrated ownership. More voting rights while relative less of cash flow rights 
held by controlling shareholders enable them to extract corporate assets (Lins, 2003). 
Controlling shareholders are more likely to extract a large amount of private benefits 
since they have control in excess of cash flow rights. During the Asian financial crisis, 
an expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders as well as 
managers is extensive and severe (Mitton, 2002). 
The greater the ultimate control rights held by the controlling shareholders, or 
the larger the separation of control rights and cash flow rights, the larger private 
benefits the controlling shareholders extract, the greater the incentive for controlling 
shareholders to engage in expropriation, the more serious the conflict of interest 
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In light of 
conventional view, the more inefficient the firm's management, on the one hand, the 
market for transfer of ownership is more likely to occur to mitigate the agency 
problems because the benefits of a takeover for a bidder are high with the replacement 
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of inefficient management. On the other hand, managers or large shareholders who 
expropriate minority shareholders and enjoy private benefits tend to create 
value-decreasing takeover barriers that increase the cost of a takeover, thus reducing 
the likelihood of a takeover. In countries with poor protection of minority 
shareholders, controlling shareholders have more fear of losing control associated 
with the private benefits, thereby struggling for maintaining their control (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)). Therefore, whether a firm would be a target 
of an acquisition will be determined by these two opposite forces. 
However, we state that domestic firms in which the largest shareholder has a 
high level of control rights are more difficult to transfer control. The largest 
shareholder who extracts an enormous amount of private benefits is more likely to 
take defensive measures to resist potential acquirers. Thus, acquisitions become costly 
and unlikely when the largest shareholder possesses a high degree of control rights in 
domestic firms. 
Furthermore, we also argue that domestic firms with a high degree level of the 
separation of control rights and cash flow rights (a symptom of poor corporate 
governance) are less likely to be targeted by foreign firms. First of all, as previously 
argued, the private benefits are huge and significant when the largest shareholder 
possesses a level of control rights that exceed cash flow rights. He fears "a control 
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grab by outsiders", thus "striving to retain his control" (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). 
Second, from a view point of acquirers, a firm characterized by a high degree level of 
the separation of control rights and cash flow rights is a symptom of poor corporate 
governance. In distressed circumstances, foreign firms are less likely to take over it 
because it signals poor fundamentals in terms of corporate governance. Thirdly, the 
large divergence between control rights and cash flow rights held by large 
shareholders facilitates entrenchment thus increasing the cost of an acquisition bid. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the incumbent large shareholders would like to 
relinquish their control when they confront with liquidity constraint in a period of 
crisis. The incumbents who have a relatively small control in the case of liquidity 
constraint may give up their control. 
To complement liquidity hypothesis, we incorporate the liquidity effect into the 
role of corporate governance. Cash-constrained firms with a high degree of the 
separation of control and ownership are less attractive than those with a low degree of 
the separation of control and ownership. The role of a low level of separation of 
control and ownership in acquisition is more prominent and significant when a firm is 
in financial distress. 
Thus, we argue that domestic firms with a shortage of liquidity and without a 
separation of ownership and control are more likely to be targeted by foreign firms 
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during the crisis. The incumbent shareholders who own few control rights (or an 
equivalent level of cash flow rights) are more likely to relinquish their control of 
company if they face liquidity constraint during the crisis. They are willing to reduce 
their ownership of voting rights by selling their shares to raise funds if they could not 
reap private benefits of effectively controlling firms. Firms with rich cash and a high 
degree of the separation of control and ownership are unlikely to be targeted by 
foreign firms. Firstly, cash-rich firms are more likely and effective in deterring 
acquisition attempts. Thus, an acquisition of a liquidity-rich firm is a high-cost, low-
benefit transaction. Secondly, a high degree of the separation of control and 
ownership is associated with more severe expropriation, large potential agency 
problems, poor performance and weak corporate governance. These unfavorable 
fundamentals make them less attractive for foreign investors. Thirdly, large 
shareholders who hold control rights in excess of cash flow rights struggle to retain 
their control when they do not face liquidity constraint because they can derive large 
private benefits of control. 
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Chapter 4 Sample Construction 
4.1 Data Descriptions 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from Thompson Financial Securities 
Data Company's (SDC) mergers and acquisitions database, which contains details of 
cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions. SDC collates information from 
new sources, SEC filings and their international counterparts, trade publications, 
newswire reports and proprietary surveys of investment banks, law firms and other 
advisory firms. The database contains all public and private M&A transactions 
involving at least 5% ownership of the target firm. The database provides some 
characteristics of the target and acquiring firm such as name, nation, industry sector, 
and primary SIC classification. For each transaction, the database contains date on 
which the deal was announced and the date on which the deal became effective. Many 
of the transactions contain ownership-specific information such as the percent of 
shares acquired, the percent of shares owned before and after the transaction is 
completed, and the percent of shares sought by the acquiring firm. 
Our primary sample contains both domestic and cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions announced between January 1, 1993 and December 31，2002. We choose 
this period for two reasons. The number as well as the deal values of mergers and 
acquisitions have surged since the 1990s, and the market for M&A have been more 
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vibrant in the second half of the 1990s. Second, we eliminate the period prior to 1993 
as the coverage of accounting information in SDC and Worldscope is rare. The firms 
come from the five crisis-affected countries, which are also studied by Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2003).These five countries were severely hit by the financial crisis and 
experienced a large slump in stock markets (Mitton, 2002). Furthermore, these five 
economies belong to emerging markets, which are associated with highly 
concentrated ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens 
et al., (2000, 2002)), less developed capital markets, high private benefits of control 
(Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004)), and weak legal protection of 
minority shareholders (La Porta, et al., 1999 ). 
Table 1 describes the process of sample selection for acquired firms from SDC. 
SDC reports 6537 completed deals in the five crisis-stricken countries over the period 
from 1993 to 2002. 40% of completed deals or 2650 deals involved with ultimate 
parent public status. One third of completed deals or 2010 deals are cross-border deals, 
25% of which involve a publicly traded firm. After eliminating financial firms, our 
sample yields 1845 completed deals involving public traded firms. Subsidiary firms 
are identified as public traded firms in SDC while they may not be listed on the local 
stock exchange. We also remove firms without sufficient accounting information in 
our regression estimation. 
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Of all mergers and acquisitions involved in the five countries, hostile targets 
reported by SDC are rare. This indicates that hostile takeovers are less likely to be 
welcome in emerging markets due to cultural difference. It could also be the case that 
the market for corporate control is underdeveloped in emerging markets (Lins, 2003). 
Hence, the characteristics of hostile target studied in other paper may not be 
applicable to that in emerging markets. 
To construct our sample that contains both acquired firms and non-acquired 
firms, we supplement data on target firms from SDC with data on non-target firms 
from Worldscope. Firms reported by SDC are acquired firms, while firms contained 
in Worldscope but not reported by SDC are identified as non-acquired firms. We 
exclude financial firms from our analysis in order to improve the comparability of 
balance sheet and income data. Meanwhile, our sample is restricted to non-financial 
firms to eliminate the influence of differences in financial and regulatory changes on 
the likelihood of acquisitions. So firms that contain SIC code 6000-6999 are excluded 
from our sample. We also eliminate firms that do not contain accounting information 
corresponding to the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement of the 
transaction. Firms with missing values in independent variables are excluded from our 
regression. Hereby, in our regression analysis, sample sizes vary across variables. 
We construct two sets of data from SDC and Worldscope. The first one is panel 
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data, which contains financial and accounting information for the analysis of financial 
characteristics of acquired firms. For acquired firms, SDC reports financial 
information on the date of the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement of the 
transaction. For non-acquired firms, we obtain financial information from 
Worldscope. 
Our second data set mainly consists of ownership structures for the analysis of 
governance characteristics of target firms by foreign investors. The primary sample 
includes 947 firms, of which 227 firms are involved in mergers and acquisitions that 
occurred in 1998 while 720 firms are non-targets in 1998. We match our sample of 
both acquired and non-acquired firms with ownership data compiled by Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000/. This retains 766 firms in our sample, which contain 
ownership data such as control rights and cash flow rights held by the largest 
shareholder, and a variety of dummy variables. Meanwhile, we also compile data on 
the ownership by blockholders from Worldscope. Worldscope contains the names of 
officers and owners, which enables us to distinguish the ultimate block ownership 
affiliated with management from those unaffiliated with management. We also use 
Asian Handbook 1999 to compare a list of significant persons of companies^ with a 
a Details on the computation of control rights and cash flow rights are provided in Claessens et al. 
(2000). 
b A list of significant persons include officers, CEO, managers, directors, presidents, chairman and 
their family members based on overlapping surnames (Lins, 2003). 
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list of owners. Thus, we can trace out the ultimate control of the blockholders. We 
create a dummy variable, which is equal to one if owners are one of significant 
persons listed at Worldscope or Asian Handbook 1999. 
4.2 Variable Descriptions 
Three sets of variables are employed in this thesis for the analysis of acquired 
firms' characteristics. The first set of variables is financial variables, which are used to 
investigate the financial characteristics of domestic firms acquired by foreign firms. 
Details on the description of financial variables are provided in Appendix 2. We 
measure liquidity as the ratio of net sales to total assets, which reflect the liquidity 
situation of firms. 
To test whether poorly performing firms are more likely to be targets, we use 
ROE (return on equity) and ROA (return on asset) for the most recent fiscal year prior 
to the announcement of the transaction as proxies for operating profitability. These 
two financial ratios have similar meanings. ROE measures the operating efficiency of 
firms，while ROA reflects the efficient use of corporate assets by managers. Firms 
with low ROA or low ROE could be an indication of inefficient operation. Poorly 
performing firms are characterized by low ROA or low ROE. We compare the 
coefficients on ROA and ROE during a crisis year with the ones in other years. The 
coefficients on ROA and ROE are expected to be positive (as described in chapter 2 
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hypothesis) during a crisis year since high ROA or ROE serves as a strong signal of 
good corporate governance, in spite of financial distress circumstances. 
To measure the effects of growth prospects on the likelihood of foreign 
acquisitions, we use the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets as a proxy for 
investment opportunity. We also use sales growth as an alternative measure of growth 
opportunity. High sales growth indicates favorable growth opportunities. 
To measure the valuation effect, we consider two proxies. The first is M/B ratio 
(market-to-book ratio). A number of studies have used M/B ratio to evaluate the 
financial characteristics of the likely target firms. The second is P/E ratio. P/E ratio 
(price-earnings ratio) captures the market's growth expectations for a firm in a certain 
industry. P/E ratio captures the valuation effects, similar to M/B ratio. 
The second set of variables is used to measure ownership concentration. We use 
those proxies developed by Mitton (2002) for ownership concentration. The first one 
is called the largest blockholder concentration, which is defined as the cash flow 
rights of the largest blockholder with at least 5% of stakes. We also use control rights 
held by the largest shareholder to measure controlling concentration. Besides, we also 
identify ownership held by the largest shareholder affiliated with management with at 
least 5% of stakes. 
The third set of variables is divergence between voting rights and cash flow 
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rights of the controlling shareholder. We use this divergence to measure the degree of 
separation of control from ownership. We also create a dummy variable that takes 
value one if a firm has a divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights of the 
controlling shareholder and takes value zero, otherwise. 
We include a variety of control variables that may affect the likelihood of foreign 
acquisitions in our models. It is noted that the tidal wave of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in the five crisis-stricken countries can be mainly attributed to changes in 
government policies that include the relaxation of ownership restrictions and the 
introduction of international accounting standard. For example, in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, Korea and Thailand have introduced various measures to encourage 
business consolidations through mergers and acquisitions, as well as the liberalization 
of trade and investment regime (Mody and Negishi, 2001). The changes in 
government policies have led to the surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
To eliminate the influence of difference in regulatory changes on the likelihood of 
foreign acquisition, we include dummy variables for country, year, and industry. This 
controls for any changes in government policies, macroeconomic environment，and 
other omitted variables that may vary across industries, countries and time (Aguiar 
and Gopinath, 2003). Our industry dummy variables are based on 2-digit SIC codes. 
We control for firm size, measured by the logarithm of total assets (in million 
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U.S. dollars/. To account for the possibility that debt may affect the probability of a 
takeover, we control for leverage measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total 
capital for the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement of transaction. 
a Worldscope reports In (Asset) in both local currencies and in U.S. dollars. We use In (Asset) in U.S. 
dollars in the regressions and do not need to convert local currencies into one currency. 
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Chapter 5 Regression Results on Financial Characteristics 
This chapter investigates the financial characteristics of domestic firms before 
they are acquired by foreign firms. Section 5.1 explains our methodology, which 
largely follows the techniques of Aguiar and Gopinath (2003), but also differs in 
important aspects. Section 5.2 conducts univariate analysis and reports summary 
statistics of financial variables. Section 5.3 investigates the entire sample using panel 
data analysis. Section 5.4 estimates various separate regressions for the crisis year and 
conducts cross-sectional analysis. Section 5.5 investigates whether domestic firms 
that are acquired by other domestic firms exhibit similar characteristics to those 
acquired by foreign firms in section 5.3. 
5.1 Methodology and Econometric Model 
To investigate the financial characteristics of domestic firms that were acquired 
by foreign firms during the crisis, we employ a logit model to discern difference in 
financial characteristics between two groups of firms. We largely follow the 
methodology developed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2003). We estimate linear 
probability regressions by using panel data set as follows: 
丨…(X,,,) + Pi (X伸,)* A 8 + D肿 + 
The dependent variable takes the value one if firm j in industry i in 
country c is acquired in year t by a foreign firm, and takes the value zero 
4 1 
otherwise. X is a vector of financial variables. The variable D揪 is an indicator 
variable for the year 1998. For acquired firms, it takes value one if the acquisition is 
made in the year 1998 and takes zero otherwise. The interaction between financial 
variables X and a dummy variable of D巩 not only allows for changes in slope 
but also incorporates the crisis effect on the likelihood of foreign acquisitions. Z)^ ,^ , is 
a vector of dummy variables, which include firm, industry, country and year fixed 
e f f e c t s . � i s a white noise term. 
To account for the possibility that other factors such as the changes in regulatory 
policies across industry, country and time influence on the likelihood of foreign 
acquisitions, we include a set of dummy variables as described above. We choose a 
fixed effect framework for two reasons. First, a fixed effect framework could be 
designed to test for variation in the financial variables. Second, we control for any 
changes in government policies, macroeconomic environment and other omitted 
variables by including dummy variables for country, year and industry. 
There is a dilemma between a choice-based sample and a random sample. A 
choice-based sample yields biased and inconsistent estimates of parameters while it 
has high predictive power (Palepu, 1986) and improves the precision of the parameter 
estimates (Shivdasani, 1993). A random sample is an appropriate methodology to 
estimate the impact of financial variables on the likelihood of acquisitions, although it 
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may have a low predictive ability (Palepu, 1986). 
We choose a logit model in our multivariate analysis for two reasons. First， 
unlike OLS, logistic regression has less stringent requirements. It does not require 
normally distributed variables and equality of the variance-covariances matrixes 
(homoscedasticity). Moreover, it does not assume that error terms are normally 
distributed. Second, we use a random sample rather than an equal share sample (a 
choice-based sample results in a high proportion of target firms than a random sample) 
to correct the potential problems argued by Palepu (1986). Hereby, in our sample, the 
number of acquired firms is not equal to the number of non-acquired firms. They have 
been sampled at different rates. With the use of logit model, all the biases are reflected 
in the intercept term^, whereas the coefficients of explanatory variables are not 
affected in spite of unequal sampling rate. 
5.2 Summary Statistics of Financial Variables 
A. Foreign Acquisition Targets vs Non-Foreign Acquisition Targets during the 
Crisis (1998) 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of financial variables. The last column of the 
table contains t-statistics for difference in mean values between the two types of firms. 
We divide our sample into two groups (sub-samples) based on whether domestic firms 
® Intercept could capture the bias in the logit estimated coefficients and the coefficients on slope are 
unafifect^ (Shivdasani, 1993, page 180). 
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are acquired by foreign firms during the crisis year of 1998. Thus, these two groups 
are foreign-acquired firms and non-foreign-acquired firms, respectively. 
Panel A in Table 2 presents univariate analysis^ on the financial characteristics 
across these two groups during the crisis year of 1998. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, 
the mean of growth rate in sales for acquired firms is 52.63 percent, which is larger 
than their counterparts with a mean of 21.06 percent in sales growA rate, but the 
difference between these two groups is statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, for an 
alternative measure of investment opportunity, the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets for acquired firms averages 13.15 percent whereas the corresponding ratio for 
firms without being involved in foreign acquisitions is 7.87 percent. As is apparent 
from Panel A of Table 2, the difference in these mean ratios for these two groups of 
firms is statistically significant at the 1% level with a t-statistic of-3.11. Preliminarily, 
this indicates that foreign firms target domestic firms with relatively favorable growth 
prospect rather than those with poor prospect, which is consistent with our main 
hypothesis that foreign firms pick up domestic firms with strong fundamentals except 
liquidity. 
Panel A also indicates that domestic firms in financial distress are more likely to 
be targeted by foreign firms relative to those cash-rich firms during the crisis year of 
a The t-statistics are computed to test the null hypothesis that the mean values between the groups are 
equal under the assumption of unequal variances. Our sample is not characterized by matching or 
paring observation. 
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1998. Domestic firms involved in foreign acquisitions have a low mean level of 
liquidity (47.98 percent), as measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets, 
compared to 70.01 percent for firms without being acquired by foreign firms. The 
difference in these mean ratios is statistically significant at thel% level (t-statistic = 
3.56). 
Panel A of Table 2 also indicates that domestic firms that are acquired by foreign 
firms outperform their counterparts before acquisitions; either performance is 
measured by ROE or ROA. The mean ROE and ROA for target firms are 24,34 
percent and 4.45 percent, respectively, while the corresponding values for firms 
without being acquired by foreign firms are -13.74 percent and 0.59 percent, 
respectively. The differences are both statistically significant from zero at thel% 
level. 
B. Foreign Acquisition Targets vs Domestic Acquisition Targets during the Crisis 
(1998) 
To investigate whether there are similar financial characteristics between 
acquired firms, we categorize acquired firms into foreign acquisition targets as well as 
domestic acquisition targets, based on the nation of acquirers. Panel B in Table 2 
presents univariate comparison of foreign acquisition targets and domestic acquisition 
targets during the crisis. As previously, firms involved in foreign acquisitions have a 
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high mean of sales growth, as compared to that ratio of firms acquired by domestic 
firms. Similarly, the mean ratio of capital expenditures to total assets for domestic 
firms acquired by foreign firms is 13.15 percent, as compared to 5.01 percent for 
firms involved in domestic acquisitions. The difference between these two groups of 
firms is statistically significant at the 1% level. The mean liquidity ratio for firms 
involved in foreign acquisition is 47.98 percent, compared to 81.61 percent for those 
involved in domestic acquisition. The difference in liquidity measure between these 
two groups of firms is statistically significant. 
C. Pre-Crisis Period (1993-1996) 
Panel C presents comparison of mean values of financial variables between firms 
involved in foreign acquisitions and those not during the pre-crisis years of 1993-1996. 
The mean sales growth for acquired firms is 12.94 percent, compared to 30.13 percent 
for those without being involved in foreign acquisitions. The difference of 17.19 is 
significant. Nonetheless, for alternative measure of growth opportunities, the mean 
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets for acquired firms is similar to those 
without being involved in foreign acquisitions. They are 9.11 percent and 8.93 percent, 
respectively. 
The mean liquidity ratio for domestic firms involved in foreign acquisitions is 
105.52 percent, which is higher than 86.00 percent for those without being acquired 
4 6 
by foreign firms, but the difference is insignificant. For the measures of operating 
efficiency (ROE and ROA), the differences in mean values between these two groups 
of firms are statistically insignificant. 
Overall, from univariate analysis, target firms are characterized by good 
operating performance and favorable growth opportunity during the crisis before they 
were acquired by foreign firms, as evidenced by high ROE，ROA and the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets during the crisis. Simultaneously, they plunge into 
a liquidity crisis and confront with a problem of cash-strapped, as evidenced by a 
shortage of liquidity. 
The univariate analysis provides some preliminary evidence in support of our 
hypotheses. However, this analysis does not control for other variables that differ 
across firms, countries and industries. In the next sub-section, we employ a 
multivariate analysis with fixed effects model to control for industry-specific and 
country-specific factors. 
5.3 The Financial Characteristics of Firms Targeted by Foreign Firms 
To specify the crisis effect on cross-border mergers and acquisitions, we interact 
an indicator variable for year 1998 with each financial variable. We compare the 
coefficients on the financial variables with those on the interaction terms to address 
the crisis effect on cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The slopes on coefficients 
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are expected to change if the crisis-year effect is in presence. 
The results of regressions on financial variables are shown in Table 3. Table 3 
reports the financial characteristics of domestic firms that are acquired by foreign 
firms in crisis year and other years. The coefficients on the interaction term between 
liquidity and the indicator variable for year 1998 are negative and statistically 
significant in specifications (1) through (4). In specification (1), the coefficient is 
-0.0120 and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that an increase in 
liquidity (measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets) is associated with a decline 
in the probability of foreign acquisitions during the crisis year. This indicates that 
domestic firms acquired by foreign firms during the crisis are characterized by a 
shortage of liquidity or in need for injection of capital. Nonetheless, the coefficients 
on the stand-alone liquidity exhibit mixed signs, and are statistically insignificant. 
They are smaller in magnitudes than those on the interaction term. The difference in 
coefficients and magnitudes between the interaction term and the stand-alone liquidity 
indicates that liquidity can explain the characteristics of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions during the crisis. This is also consistent with the view that liquidity 
constraint is a short-term phenomenon (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2003). 
As shown in specification (1), the coefficient on ROE for other periods is 
positive but insignificant. Notwithstanding, the coefficient on the interaction term 
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between ROE and the indicator variable for crisis year of 1998 is 0.0248 and 
statistically significant, indicating that ROE has a positive effect on the probability of 
foreign acquisitions during the crisis. The second column uses ROA as an alternative 
proxy for operating performance, which also yields similar results to those in 
specification (1). The coefficient on the interaction term between ROA and the 
indicator variable for year 1998 is also positive and statistically significant while the 
one on the stand-alone ROA is negative but insignificant. This is consistent with the 
view that foreign firms target relatively efficient domestic firms with good 
performance and strong ftmdamentals in spite of the crisis year and extremely poor 
environment. Nevertheless, our findings are inconsistent with the inefficient 
management hypothesis, as argued by Palepu (1986). 
In specification (4), the coefficient on the interaction term between sales growth 
and year dummy is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that domestic 
firms with high growth rate in sales are more likely to be targeted by foreign firms 
during the crisis since high sales growth signals a strong fundamental and a bright 
prospect. This is consistent with the findings that foreign firms target domestic firms 
with more productivity and strong prospect during the crisis (Aguiar and Gopinath, 
2003). This is also consistent with the view of Smith and Kim (1994) and Harford 
(1999)，who argue that firms in a cash-strapped state but with good investment 
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opportunity may seek out mergers with cash-rich firms. 
In specification (5), the coefficient on P/E ratio is positive and statistically 
significant, while the one on the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant. This indicates that high P/E increases the probability of foreign 
acquisitions in other periods while high P/E reduces the likelihood of foreign 
acquisitions during the crisis. It is a possibility that a firm characterized by low P/E 
could be an indication of undervaluation, which is more likely to be targeted by a 
foreign firm during the crisis. It also may be the case that in other periods, a high P/E 
ratio is associated with a boom in stock markets whereas during the crisis, a low P/E 
ratio is associated with a dip in stock markets. 
It is interesting to note that the coefficient on market to book ratio is positive and 
statistically significant in other periods, suggesting that firms may not be hostile 
targets as this result is inconsistent with the finding of Morck，Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988)，who argue that a hostile target is typically associated with a lower Tobin's Q. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative but statistically 
insignificant. Leverage does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of 
acquisitions during the crisis. In specification (7)，the coefficients on leverage during 
other years and the crisis year are both negative but statistically insignificant. 
5,4 The Financial Characteristics of Firms Targeted by Foreign Firms during the 
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Crisis Year 
Table 4 reports the results of regressions for the crisis year of 1998. It is 
consistent with early finding that the coefficients on liquidity are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (except for specification (2) at the 5% level of 
significance). Consistent with the results in Table 3, ROE and ROA are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications. 
In model (5) and model (6)，we test the robustness of results by including all key 
financial variables. The results remain robust, although there are somewhat changes in 
magnitudes. The coefficients on liquidity, ROE and ROA are still significant at the 1% 
level while the coefficient on sales growth is significant at the 5% level in model (6). 
It is interesting to note that firm size is positively associated with the probability of 
acquisitions, which is inconsistent with the conventional view that small firms are 
more likely to be targets (Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986)，and Morck, SchliefFer, 
and Vishny (1988)). However, our results in Table 4 are consistent with the earlier 
results of Schwert (2000), who finds that larger size raises the likelihood of a takeover. 
It could be the case that the samples in early studies consist of a hostile target while 
hostile takeover is infrequent in emerging markets. Second, we use a random sample 
to test while they use a choice-based sample (match targets with non-targets by size 
and industry). Third, we categorize acquired firms into foreign acquisition targets and 
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non-foreign acquisition targets, respectively, while they focus on differential 
characteristics between domestic acquisition targets and non-target firms. Target firms 
with large size are involved in foreign acquisitions rather than domestic acquisitions. 
It is possible that foreign firms have sufficient funds to take over large domestic firms 
in financial distress during the crisis. 
5.5 The Financial Characteristics of Firms Targeted by Other Domestic Firms 
To investigate whether firms targeted by other domestic firms demonstrate 
similar characteristics to those involved in foreign acquisitions analyzed in section 5.3, 
we estimate the same regression models used in Table 3 but change the dependent 
variable. The dependent variable is set to one if a domestic firm is acquired by another 
domestic firm, and otherwise it is zero. Table 5 reports the financial characteristics of 
domestic firms acquired by other domestic firms. It is interesting to note that the 
coefficients on the interaction term between liquidity and the indicator variable for 
year 1998 in model (1) and model (2) are positive and statistically significant, 
compared to negative coefficients under foreign-domestic acquisitions. In contrast 
with foreign-domestic acquisitions, firms targeted by other domestic firms are 
associated with more liquidity. This is consistent with the view that other domestic 
firms that are in equally a shortage of liquidity during the crisis may seek out to merge 
with more liquidity firms to alleviate the burden of cash-tightened. It is interesting to 
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note that the signs on the interaction term are not robust but mixed. They are negative 
but insignificant in model (3) and (4). 
The coefficients on the interaction term between measures of operating 
efficiency (ROA) and the indicator variable for year 1998 are positive, but are 
statistically insignificant and have smaller magnitudes, compared to those in foreign 
acquisitions in Table 3. It could be the case that domestic firms in financial distress 
may not have sufficient cash to acquire other domestic firms with high ROE because 
such acquisitions would be costly. 
The coefficients on the interaction term between measures of growth prospect 
and the indicator variable for year 1998 are negative, compared to positive 
coefficients in foreign acquisitions in Table 3. In model (3), the coefficient on the 
interaction term is significant while it is insignificant in model (4). Our findings 
indicate that only foreign firms target those with high growth opportunities during the 
crisis while domestic firms do not. This is consistent with the findings of Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2003) that growth opportunities may not be a driving force for domestic 
acquisitions during the crisis. Our results as described above indicate that there are 
different characteristics between foreign acquisitions and domestic acquisitions. 
The coefficient on the interaction term between P/E ratio and the indicator 
variable for year 1998 is positive but statistically insignificant while M/B is 
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insignificant. The coefficient on the interaction term between leverage and the 
indicator variable for year 1998 is negative but statistically insignificant. 
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Chapter 6 Regression Results on Governance Characteristics 
This chapter assesses the governance characteristics of domestic firms before 
they are acquired by foreign investors under the crisis circumstances. We present our 
methodology and regression model in section 6.1. Section 6.2 reports summary 
statistics of corporate governance variables measured by ownership structures. 
Section 6.3 examines the ownership characteristics of acquired firms during the crisis 
year of 1998. Section 6.4 investigates the interactive effects of a liquidity variable 肌d 
ownership variables on the likelihood of foreign acquisitions. Section 6.5 estimates 
various separate regressions for the pre-crisis period. Section 6.6 investigates whether 
domestic firms that are acquired by other domestic firms have similar characteristics 
during the crisis. 
6.1 Methodology and Econometric Model 
To investigate the ownership characteristics of acquired firms and assess the 
effect of corporate governance on the probability of foreign acquisitions, we estimate 
the following regression model by using cross-section data. 
Y^ = a + {CGj) + Pi (FV.) + {CVj) + p, {CountryDummy) + p, {IndustryDummy) + s 
The dependent variable Yj takes value one if a domestic firm j is acquired by a 
foreign firm, and takes the value zero otherwise. CG is a vector of corporate 
governance variables while FV is a vector of financial variables and CV are some 
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control variables. 
We include dummy variables for industry at two-digit SIC codes. We also control 
for country fixed effects by including four country dummies for the five countries, but 
not for year because we focus particularly on the crisis year of 1998, when there is no 
time-series dimension. The country dummy variables allow us to control for the effect 
of changes in government policy and regulatory environment on the likelihood of 
foreign acquisition. We include a variety of control variables in this regression model 
to ensure that the corporate governance effects are not due to other correlated factors. 
We control for firm size with logarithm of total assets (in million U.S. dollars). We 
also include leverage as a control variable to account for free cash flow theory (Jensen, 
1986). 
In this section, our methodology is somewhat different from that in section 5.1. 
We use cross-sectional analysis in this section for two reasons. First, there is little 
variation on ownership data year by year. This gives rise to the potential problem of 
serially correlation if panel data is used. Second, Worldscope does not contain too 
many ownership data before 1996. Due to limited data availability, we fail to compile 
time-series data on ownership. We employ a cross-sectional framework to estimate 
separate regressions. 
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6.2 Summery Statistics of Ownership Variables 
A. During the Crisis 
From the perspective of ownership structures, we state that given a shortage of 
capital, firms that are less effectively controlled by the largest blockhoder are more 
likely to be targeted by foreign acquirers during the crisis. 
Table 6 (Panel A) presents summary statistics^ on corporate governance 
variables measured by ownership structures during the crisis year of 1998. The mean 
voting rights held by the largest blockholder for domestic firms acquired by foreign 
firms is 24.18 percent, as compared to 29.72 percent for firms without being involved 
in foreign acquisitions. The difference of 5.54 percent is statistically significant 
(t-statistic = 2.30; p-value = 0.0292). Similarly, the largest blockholder on average 
holds 21.07 percent of cash flow rights in acquired firms whereas for those 
non-foreign acquisition firms, the largest blockholder owns 25.55 percent of mean 
cash flow rights. The difference in mean values between these two groups of firms is 
also statistically significant (t-statistic = 1.94; p-value = 0.0622). The mean 
percentage of ownership held by the largest shareholder for acquired firms is 23.79 
whereas the one for firms without being acquired is 30.21. The difference is also 
statistically significant. Our findings suggest that differences in ownership structures 
a The t-statistics are computed to test the null hypothesis that the mean values between the groups are 
equal under the assumption of unequal variances. Our sample is not characterized by matching or 
paring observation. 
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measuring corporate governance characteristics, as well as financial characteristics 
across firms in the previous chapter, can explain the behavior of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions during the crisis year of 1998. 
Furthermore, firms involved in foreign acquisitions have a lower level of the 
separation of control rights and cash flow rights held by the largest blockholder, as 
compared to that of firms without being acquired. The mean separation between 
control rights and cash flow rights for acquired firms is 3.11 percent whereas that for 
firms without being targeted by foreign firms is 4.17 percent. Nevertheless, the 
difference is insignificant. Thus, the univariate analysis is partly consistent with our 
hypotheses. It can be the case that the univariate statistics reported in Table 6 do not 
control for other variables that differ across firms, industries and countries. A 
multivariate analysis presented in next sub-section to control some variables for the 
further examination of the degree of the separation of control rights and cash flow 
rights on the probability of foreign acquisitions. 
With regard to interaction terms, the mean percentage of the interaction between 
liquidity and control for target firms is 975.56, compared to 2089.58 for non-target 
firms. The difference is statistically significant (t-statistic = 6.11; p-value = 0.0000). 
Similarly, for the interaction term between liquidity and separation, the difference 
between the groups is also statistically significant, as evidenced by a t-statistic of 5.61. 
5 8 
However，as noted earlier, for stand-alone separation variables, the difference 
between the groups is insignificant (t-statistic = 1.03). 
The t-statistics for the interaction terms incorporating liquidity are larger than the 
ones for corresponding stand-alone ownership variables. This suggests that firms in 
financial distress that are less controlled by the largest shareholders are more likely to 
be targets during the crisis. 
B. In the Pre-Crisis Period 
Panel B of Table 6 compares the ownership characteristics of domestic firms that 
were acquired by foreign firms with those not involved in foreign acquisitions in the 
pre-crisis period. In contrast with the results in panel A, panel B shows that firms 
involved in foreign acquisitions have a high mean of control rights, and cash flow 
rights held by the largest blockholder, as compared to those without being involved in 
foreign acquisitions. However, the differences in mean values between these two 
groups are statistically insignificant. The degree of separation of control and 
ownership for acquired firms is higher than that for firms without being involved in 
foreign acquisitions. 
In contrast with the crisis period, the interaction terms for target firms in the 
pre-crisis period are larger than the ones for non-foreign-acquired firms. Furthermore, 
for each interaction term, the difference in mean values between these two groups of 
5 9 
firms is statistically insignificant. 
6.3 The Ownership Structure Characteristics of Target Firms during the Crisis 
The univariate results show that there is a low level of control rights held by the 
largest shareholders in acquired firms, which provides preliminary evidence 
consistent with our main hypothesis. Notwithstanding, other factors that may affect 
the probability of foreign acquisitions are not addressed in the previous univariate 
analysis. To account for the possibility that other variables may have significant 
effects on the likelihood of foreign acquisitions, we include a variety of control 
variables that vary across firms, industries and countries. We control for firm size, as 
measured by the logarithm of total assets (in million U.S. dollars). We control for 
leverage with the ratio of long-term debt to total shareholder's equity. As predicted 
previously, acquired firms have some financial characteristics. For example, liquidity 
and operating performance have significant effects on the probability of foreign 
acquisitions, so we control for liquidity effect as measured by the ratio of net sales to 
total assets while we use ROE as a proxy for operating performance. As mentioned 
previously, we control for cross-country variations using country fixed effects while 
we control for industry effects by including indicator variables for two-digit SIC 
codes. In all regression specifications, we correct for heteroskedasticity using robust 
standard errors. 
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Table 7 presents the results of logit regressions on ownership structure variables. 
In Panel A，we control for firm size and leverage whereas we use liquidity and ROE 
as control variables in Panel B. Panel C includes all key control variables mentioned 
above to test the robustness of the results. 
We use control rights and cash flow rights as independent variables in 
specifications (1) and (2), respectively. In specification (3), we use the difference 
between control rights and cash flow rights to measure the degree of separation of 
control and ownership. We also create a separation dummy in specification (5), which 
is set to one if control rights are high than cash flow rights and is zero otherwise. In 
specification (6), we include a management dummy, which is equal to one if the 
controlling shareholder is affiliated with management and zero otherwise. 
In Panel A of Table 7, the coefficient on control rights is negatively associated 
with the probability of foreign acquisitions (significant at the 1% level), indicating 
that a high level of control rights held by the largest shareholder reduces the 
probability of foreign acquisitions during the crisis. This is consistent with the idea 
that controlling shareholders strive to retain their control when a huge amount of 
private benefits arises from the expropriation of minority shareholders during the 
crisis. The coefficient on cash flow rights is also negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that foreign firms target domestic firms in which the largest shareholder has 
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few cash flow rights. 
The coefficient on separation (divergence between control rights and cash flow 
rights) is negative but insignificant in specification (3), while it is significant at the 
10% level (10% is not strictly significant) in specification (4) without the inclusion of 
leverage. Meanwhile, the coefficient on an indicator variable for separation is -0.0154 
and significant, indicating that the probability of acquisitions declines by almost 0.015 
percentage points for firms with a divergence between control rights and cash flow 
rights during the crisis, as compared to those without divergence. This indicates that 
foreign firms target domestic firms with a low degree of the separation of control 
rights and cash flow tights. This is consistent with the view that controlling 
shareholders possessing control rights beyond cash flow rights fear losing control and 
struggle to maintain their control (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). This is also 
consistent with the view that firms in which a blockholder holds a high level of 
control rights but owns relatively small cash flow rights are less attractive to foreign 
acquirers during the crisis because a high degree of the separation of control from 
ownership is a symptom of poor corporate governance, more severe expropriation and 
poor performance. 
The coefficient on an indicator variable for blockholder involved in management 
is -0.0116 and statistically significant at the 10% level (10% is not strictly significant), 
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suggesting that the probability of acquisitions declines by 0.01 percentage points for 
firms with largest blockholder involved in management during the crisis, as compared 
to those without involved in management. Furthermore, specification (7) suggests that 
more ownership held by large shareholders affiliated with management reduces the 
probability of acquisitions. These findings are consistent with Shivdasani (1993) and 
Weisbach (1993), who argue that blockholders involved with management are more 
likely to extract a huge amount of private benefits and thus struggle to retain their 
control, thereby hindering the acquisitions. This is also consistent with the view that 
blockholders have an incentive to take defensive measures against potential acquirers 
when they are affiliated with management. It is surprising to note the coefficients on 
firm size are positive and statistically significant in specifications (6) through (8), 
inconsistent with other findings mentioned in the literature. The coefficients on 
leverage are negative, but not significant in all specifications. 
We re-estimate our regression models in Panel B using liquidity and ROE as 
control variables. Panel B yields similar results to those in Panel A. The coefficients 
on all key ownership variables are negative and significant except the ones on cash 
flow rights. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on separation is insignificant in 
specification (3) after controlling for liquidity and ROE. All regressions in Panel B 
show that the coefficients on liquidity are negatively significant while the coefficients 
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on ROE are positively significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with our early 
findings that foreign firms target domestic firms with low liquidity but high ROE. 
Panel C of Table 7 tests the robustness of the results presented in Panel A and 
Panel B with the inclusion of all key control variables previously employed in our 
regression models. For robustness checks, we do not include all ownership variables 
in one regression because there may be collinearity among ownership variables. 
Instead, we estimate separate regressions with various ownership variables, 
respectively. It is interesting to note that the separation of control and ownership is 
statistically insignificant after controlling for all the key financial variables. 
Nonetheless, the indicator variable for separation is still robust and negatively 
significant. Other ownership variables are also significant and robust. This indicates 
that including the additional control variables has little effect on changing the 
measures of ownership variables. With respect to control variables, liquidity is still 
negatively and significant related to the probability of acquisitions while ROE is 
positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of acquisitions in all 
regression models. However, the coefficients on firm size are insignificant except for 
specification (2) and (6). 
We also test the robustness of the results including market-to-book ratio, the 
ratio of capital expenditures to total assts and sales growth (as proxies for growth 
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opportunity) in the above regression models. The unreported results are still robust 
and the coefficients on the main ownership variables retain their statistical 
significance. In addition, we also test the robustness of the results using an alternative 
measure of operating performance. The results remain robust when we measure 
operating performance by ROA. We include firm age as a control variable because 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) suggest that hostile targets are older while 
friendly targets are younger. However, the coefficients on firm age are insignificant 
while the coefficients on the key ownership variables are still significant. 
6.4 Interaction between Liquidity and Corporate Governance Variables during 
the Crisis 
As argued in our hypotheses, the role of ownership structures in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions is more prominent and significant when a target firm 
plunges into a liquidity crisis. Shareholders who lack effective control in 
cash-strapped firms may surrender their shares due to liquidity concerns in extremely 
constrained circumstances. Our main hypothesis states that domestic firms with low 
liquidity but good corporate governance (an indicator of good corporate governance is 
a low degree of the separation of control rights and cash flow rights) during the crisis 
are more likely to be targeted by foreign firms. To measure the combined (interactive) 
effects of liquidity and corporate governance measured by ownership structures on the 
6 5 
probability of acquisitions during the crisis, we interact a liquidity variable, as before, 
measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets, with corporate governance variables 
measuring the degree of the separation of control and ownership. 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of regressing the probability of foreign 
acquisitions on the interaction terms. We use the interaction term between liquidity 
and control rights in model (1) through model (3). The coefficient on the interaction 
term in specification (1) is -0.0008 without controlling for any financial variables. 
Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term in specification (3) is also negative 
and significant at the 1% level after all key financial variables are controlled for. This 
suggests that low liquidity and low control rights in the hands of the largest 
shareholder raise the probability of acquisitions during the crisis. 
In specification (4) through specification (6), we include the interaction term 
between a liquidity variable and a separation variable to investigate the combined 
effects of liquidity and ownership structures on the probability of foreign acquisitions. 
Recall from Table 6, the coefficients on stand-alone separation are statistically 
insignificant. Nonetheless, the coefficient on the interaction term between liquidity 
and separation is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in specification 
(4) without controls for size and leverage. This is consistent with our view that 
separation of control from ownership plays a more important role in the determination 
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of foreign acquisitions when liquidity concerns are simultaneously taken into account. 
Our results also indicate that shareholders are willing to relinquish their control in 
exchange for liquidity when they plunge into a liquidity crisis and they possess few 
control rights in excess of cash flow rights. It is also consistent with the idea that 
acquisition is less costly and more likely to occur when shareholders are 
cash-strapped and target firms are associated with a low level of separation of control 
and ownership. 
In Panel B of Table 8，we use a binary term (a dummy variable for separation) 
rather than the continuous variable used in Panel A to interact with a liquidity variable. 
The main idea behind this interaction is that all else equal, firms with separation of 
control and ownership are less likely to become the targets of foreign acquisition, than 
those without separation of control and ownership when liquidity concerns are 
incorporated into a dummy of separation. As shown in Panel B, the coefficients on the 
interaction term are negative and statistically significant in all specifications. In 
specification (3), the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.0386 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that firms with more liquidity and the 
existence of separation of control and ownership are less likely to be targeted by 
foreign firms, than those without separation of control and ownership. This is 
consistent with the idea that on the one hand, the acquisition of cash-rich firms is 
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more costly, thereby discouraging the acquisition; on the other hand, large 
shareholders who effectively control the firms are less likely to relinquish their 
control when they do not face a shortage of liquidity. 
As noted early in Table 7, the coefficients on the indicator variable for separation 
are negative and statistically significant. Notwithstanding, as shown in panel B of 
Table 8, the coefficients on stand-alone separation indicator variable are mixed 
(positive in specification (5) but negative in specification (6), respectively). They are 
both statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the coefficients on the interaction term 
between the indicator variable for separation and liquidity in all specifications are 
negative and statistically significant. This reinforces our view that cash-rich firms 
with separation of control from ownership reduce the probability of being acquired 
during the crisis. The coefficients on the stand-alone liquidity variable are negative, 
and significant in specification (4) and (6) with all key control variables included, 
while the coefficients on ROE is positive and significant. This is consistent with our 
earlier findings. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the coefficients on the interaction term 
in all specifications exhibit larger magnitude than the ones on the stand-alone liquidity 
variable. This indicates that liquidity is one of but not the only one determinant of 
foreign acquisitions during the crisis. The premise that high liquidity reduces the 
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probability of foreign acquisitions during the crisis may become a plausible 
explanation. The stronger explanation may be that high liquidity and a high degree of 
the separation of control and ownership have a strong and significant negative effect 
on the likelihood of foreign acquisitions than just liquidity alone does. Shareholders 
or managers with small voting rights tend to sell out their shares on the markets to 
alleviate the problem of the cash-strapped firms when they are liquidity-constrained. 
6.5 The Effects of Ownership Structures on the Likelihood of Foreign 
Acquisitions during the pre-Crisis Period 
To investigate whether corporate governance plays a crucial role in determining 
the likelihood of foreign acquisitions in the pre-crisis period, we examine the behavior 
of mergers and acquisitions that happened in the pre-crisis period, based on data at the 
end of the firm's 1996 fiscal year. Table 9 (Panel A) reports the results of regressions. 
The coefficients on control and on cash flow are both negative, but statistically 
insignificant. Meanwhile, the coefficients on separation and on a dummy variable for 
separation both are insignificant. For control variables, the coefficients on liquidity 
and on ROE are negative, but both are insignificant, which differ in signs from those 
results reported in Table 7. Leverage has a negative effect on the likelihood of 
acquisitions. 
Panel B of Table 9 shows that liquidity and other ownership measures do not 
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generate any effect on the probability of foreign acquisitions in the pre-crisis period. 
Panel C indicates that the interaction term between liquidity and an indicator variable 
for separation is positive but insignificant. Our results indicate that the behavior of 
foreign acquisitions occurring in the pre-crisis period differ from those in the crisis 
period. 
6.6 The Ownership Structure Characteristics of Domestic Firms Targeted by 
Other Domestic Firms during the Crisis 
To investigate whether domestic firms acquired by other domestic firms differ 
from those acquired by foreign firms in section 6.3, we use the same regression 
models estimated in section 6.3 but change the dependent variable. For this case, the 
dependent variable Yj is equal to one if a domestic firm j is acquired by a domestic 
firm, and takes the value zero otherwise. 
Panel A of Table 10 reports the results of regressions of the probability of 
domestic acquisitions on ownership variables. The signs of the coefficients on 
ownership variables are mixed. The coefficients on control rights and a separation 
dummy are negative, but statistically insignificant, indicating that there are different 
characteristics between domestic acquisitions and foreign acquisitions. The 
coefficients on cash flow rights and management are positive, which are different in 
magnitude and statistical significance from those in case of foreign acquisitions. This 
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indicates that domestic firms do not target firms with a low level of the separation of 
ownership and control whereas foreign firms do. 
Among control variables, the coefficients on liquidity are positive and 
statistically significant in all models (Panel A of Table 10), which is different from 
those in foreign acquisitions. This suggests that domestic acquisitions seek out to 
merge with cash-rich firms to fight against a liquidity crisis. It is also to note that high 
leverage reduces the probability of domestic acquisitions while it does not have a 
significant effect on foreign acquisitions. This is consistent with the view that 
domestic firms in financial distress are less likely to be taken over by other domestic 
firms in the same dire circumstance of financial distress, but more likely to be 
targeted by foreign investors. The above findings suggest that domestic acquisitions 
are more likely to be merged to relieve a liquidity crisis. 
With regard to the combined effects of liquidity and ownership structures, the 
coefficients on the interaction term between liquidity and control are positively 
significant (Panel B of Table 10). Nonetheless, liquidity and separation do not 
produce interactive effects on the likelihood of domestic acquisitions. Furthermore, 
Panel C shows that the signs on interaction term between liquidity and an indicator 
variable for separation are mixed under domestic acquisitions, which are different 
from those under foreign acquisitions. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion 
7.1 Additional Tests 
In Table 11, we perform multinomial logistic regressions by dividing our sample 
into three categories. They are non-targets, domestic-acquisition targets and foreign-
acquisition targets, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to one if a domestic 
firm is acquired neither by another domestic firm nor by a foreign firm. The 
multinomial logistic regression yields similar results. As shown in Table 11, firms 
with high control rights held by the largest shareholder are less likely to be involved 
in the category of foreign acquisitions, relative to those with low control rights. More 
importantly, firms with a high degree of the separation of control and ownership are 
also less likely to be involved in foreign acquisitions, than those with a low degree of 
the separation. For indicator variables, firms without separation, without affiliation 
tetween shareholders and management are more likely to be involved in the category 
Of foreign acquisitions, than those with separation ahd affiliation. 
In Table 12 and Table 13, we perform additional tests by changing the definition 
of the crisis period into November 1 1997 through December 31 1998. The reasons 
for this robustness check are as follows. First, the crisis was widespread to other Asian 
economies only in October, although the Asian financial crisis started from Thailand 
in July 1997. Second，there is a time lag between the outbreak of the Asian financial 
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crisis and the announcement of cross-border M&A deals. There is a possibility that 
M&A deals lag behind the Asian financial crisis as they take times to make 
negotiation and announcement. Third, as noted in introduction, the market for cross-
border M&A was not as active in the first ten months of 1997 as in1998. Hereby, our 
definition of the crisis period could reflect the real crisis effects on the market for 
cross-border M&A. 
As shown in Table 12，the coefficients on control, cash flow and an indicator 
variable for separation retain their significance. The coefficient on separation is 
insignificant in specification (3). The coefficient on the indicator variable for 
blockholders involved in management is significant at the 10% level (10% is not 
strictly significant); while the coefficients on ownership held by shareholders 
affiliated with management are significant at the 5% level. 
Table 13 presents the results of logit regressions on the interaction term. As 
found previously, the coefficients on the interaction term between liquidity and 
control are statistically significant at the 5% level in specifications (1) through (3). 
Similarly, the interaction term between liquidity and separation is also negatively 
associated with the likelihood of foreign acquisitions at the 10% level of significance 
(10% is not strictly significant) in specifications (4) through (5). In Panel B of Table 
13, the coefficients on the interaction term between liquidity and the indicator 
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variable for separation are negative and significant in all specifications. Furthermore, 
the magnitudes in the interaction term are larger than the stand-alone liquidity, which 
is consistent with our earlier findings. 
7.2 A Diagnostic Test 
Multicollinearity exists when two or more independent variables are highly 
correlated to one another. If there is multicollinearity, it is difficult to isolate the 
separate effects of individual explanatory variables in our various models. We conduct 
a diagnostic test on the issue of multicollinearity. We compute the values of variance 
inflation factor (VIF/ and tolerance ( l /VIF, to examine whether there exists of 
multicollinearity among independent variables. As a general rule of thumb, a 
tolerance of 0.1 or less (equivalently VIF of 10 or greater) is a cause for concern. In 
our regression models presented in Table 3, Table 4, Table 7，and Table 8, all 
independent variables have high tolerance and a low VIF value, indicating a low 
degree of multicollinearity. The tolerances are between 0.98 and 0.99. This means that 
between 98% and 99% of the variance of a particular independent variable is not 
explained by the other independent variables. None of VIF is excessively high. In this 
case, multicollinearity is relatively mild. 
^Variance inflation factor is an indicator of how much standard error could be inflated caused by 
collinearity. 
''Tolerance is an indicator of how much collinearity that a regression can tolerate. 
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7.3 Explanations and Limitations 
One concern of our study is the disciplinary role of takeovers. There is a 
conventional view that target firms are associated with poor performance and 
ineffective internal corporate governance mechanisms before acquisitions (Weisbach, 
1993) because an attempt of such acquisition involves a small premium and less cost 
but generates a large gain after the replacement of inefficient management and the 
improvement of corporate governance. Nevertheless, the evidence is weak in the 
literature (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003). There is no strong evidence to support that 
acquirers seek to take over a poorly governed firm in a period of crisis. In contrast, 
our findings show that target firms during the crisis are associated with high growth 
prospect, high ROE and good corporate governance as evidenced by a low degree of 
separation of ownership and control. Our findings suggest that cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions are motivated by the desire to seek undervalued targets (as evidenced 
by high ROE and good corporate governance) raiher than the desire to improve poorly 
governed firms. 
The conventional wisdom suggests that firms with weak corporate governance 
are more likely to be the targets of takeovers by more efficient firms (Marine (1965), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)). However, the story could be quite different during the 
crisis. Under extremely depressed circumstances, a takeover attempt of a good firm 
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could be less costly than in normal times due to a dip in stock markets and target 
firms being trapped in financial distress. Similarly, investors are more concerned 
about the fundamentals of target firms as well as corporate governance under 
confidence-depressed circumstances. It could be the case that firms with favorable 
fundamentals and good corporate governance become more attractive because they 
give a vote of confidence to foreign investors under the period of distress. 
Given a dip in stock markets and dramatic decline in asset values during the 
crisis, liquidity-strapped firms with high growth prospect, high ROE and good 
corporate governance signal the bright fundamentals and are symptom of 
undervaluation. Further studies can investigate whether firms that are undervalued are 
more likely to be targeted during the crisis. 
A number of early studies have constructed a controlling group matched by size 
and industry, while this thesis does not have. The reason is that we use panel data and 
control fixed effect. This allows us to control any variation across time，industry and 
country. Our sample represents a universe of firms covered in Worldscope, the size of 
which is sufficiently large to overcome the sample selection problem. 
The limitation of our study is that there are no comprehensive proxies for the 
quality of corporate governance. The quality of corporate governance for firms in 
emerging markets is very difficult to measure. In this thesis, we use observable 
7 6 
variables associated with the governance structure such as ownership of controlling 
shareholders, the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights held by the 
largest shareholders to measure corporate governance as well as a variety of indicator 
variables. Weisbach (1993) and Shivdasani (1993) suggest that the quality of the 
composition of the board directors is an important element of corporate governance. 
Nonetheless, we fail to construct the measures of the quality of outside directors in 
emerging markets due to data constraint. Further studies can use other measurements 
such as accounting standard, auditor and the quality of outside directors on the board 
as proxies to address the effect of corporate governance on cross-border M&A. 
7 7 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This thesis examines the financial and governance characteristics of target firms 
in the influx of cross-border mergers and acquisitions during the Asian financial crisis. 
We use accounting measures of performance in an attempt to investigate the operating 
performance of target firms before acquisitions. We also use ownership structures to 
measure the effects of corporate governance on the likelihood of takeovers. 
Using panel data from the crisis-stricken economies, we find that target firms are 
characterized by low liquidity, favorable growth prospect and high operating 
performance. This provides more evidence in support of "fire sale" M&A in the crisis 
period. Our results reinforce the claim that liquidity has a prominent effect on the 
takeover wave of the crisis. 
More importantly, using cross-section data from the five crisis-stricken countries, 
we find that firms in which shareholders have low control rights and a low degree of 
separation of control and ownership are more attractive because they are associated 
with low private benefits and less resistance to takeover. 
Furthermore, we also examine the interactive effects of liquidity and ownership 
structures on the likelihood of acquisitions. We find that block shareholders or 
managers who have less control rights in firms tend to relinquish their control when 
block shareholders are cash-tightened during the crisis. Target firms are less 
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effectively controlled by block shareholders or managers. The probability of 
acquisitions is low when block shareholders effectively control the cash-rich firms, 
whereas the probability of acquisitions is high when block shareholders less 
effectively control the firms and are cash-constrained. This indicates that the role of 
ownership structures is more significant in the likelihood of foreign acquisitions when 
liquidity is taken into account. Our findings suggest that corporate governance plays a 
crucial role in explaining the behavior of M&A activities during the Asian financial 
crisis. Our findings suggest that under distressed circumstances, firms that are 
indirectly undervalued by the markets are more likely to become attractive acquisition 
targets, while firms with better corporate governance and performance are likely to be 
the takeover candidates. 
This thesis contributes to the corporate finance literature by examining the effect 
of ownership characteristics on the cross-border M&A wave in economy-wide 
financial crisis period. Whether the effects of corporate governance on the 
cross-border M&A demonstrated in this thesis apply to other situations is an 
interesting question. Further research could determine if firms with strong corporate 
governance are more vulnerable to cross-border M&A during other crisis periods (for 
example Mexican financial crisis in 1994 or Argentine currency crisis in 2001), or 
during stable periods. This thesis suggests that firms that signal bright fundamentals, 
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including high investment opportunity and high operating performance, but low 
liquidity become attractive targets during the crisis. Further studies can extend this 
research topic by examining whether target firms are undervalued during the crisis. 
Besides, further studies can investigate the characteristics of acquiring firms in 
unstable periods. Further studies can also investigate changes in returns for both 
acquiring firms and target firms in the aftermath of M&A during the crisis. 
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Table 1 Sample Selection Criteria: Number of deals in the five crisis-hit 
countries over the period 1993-2002 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines S.Korea Thailand All 
Number of deals in SDC 1319 ' m i 2184 ” 1 3 2 0 3 
Number of completed 374 435 326 397 478 2010 
cross-border deals 
Number of completed 242 2823 341 598 523 4527 
domestic deals 
Number of completed 616 3258 667 995 1001 6537 
deals in SDC 
Number of completed 256 1132 354 421 487 2650 
deals with ultimate parent 
public status 
Number of completed 187 763 240 310 345 1845 
deals after eliminating 
financial firms 
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Table 2 Panel A: Mean and T-test for Differences in Mean Values between 
Foreign-acquired Firms and Non-foreign-acquired Firms during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998，in which there was an upswing in 
cross-border M&A. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of percentage is measured by the ratio of 
net sales to total assets. Leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total 
capital. All financial data are for the fiscal year end of 1997. The last column reports 
t-test for differences in mean values between these two groups of firms. The 
t-statistics are computed to test the null hypothesis that the mean values for 
foreign-acquired firms and non-foreign-acquired firms are equal under the assumption 
of unequal variances. P-values are in parentheses. 
Foreign-acquired firms Non-foreign-acquired firms 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T-statistic 
Sales growth 52.63 124.37 21.06 83.29 -1.36 
(0.1859) 
Cap/assets 13.15 8,97 7.87 8.29 -3.11 
(0.0041) 
LIQ 47.98 39.34 70.01 60.72 3.56 
(0.0007) 
ROE 24.34 83.09 -13.74 68.22 -3.05 
(0.0037) 
ROA 4.45 5.05 0.59 17.12 -3.97 
(0.0001) 
PE 26.20 4.83 32.62 10.00 0.58 
(0.5634) 
M/B 1.75 1.66 1.55 9.33 -0.45 
(0.6569) 
Leverage 3.09 9.33 2.59 36.67 -0.26 
(0.7984) 
Total debt/ 4.43 2.04 10.91 6.55 0.94 
Total capital (0.3455) 
In(asset) 19.36 1.47 19.00 1.46 -1.60 
(0.1151) 
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Table 2 Panel B: Comparison of Foreign Acquisition Targets and Domestic 
Acquisition Targets during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998, in which there was an upswing in 
cross-border M&A. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of percentage is measured by the ratio of 
net sales to total assets. Leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total 
capital. All financial data are for the fiscal year end of 1997. The last column reports 
t-test for differences in mean values between these two groups of firms. The 
t-statistics are computed to test the null hypothesis that the mean values for 
foreign-acquired firms and domestic-acquired firms are equal under the assumption of 
unequal variances. P-values are in parentheses. 
Foreign-acquired firms Domestic-acquired firms 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T-statistics 
Sales growth 52.63 124.37 12.82 25.76 -1.66 
(0.1059) 
Cap/assets 13.15 8.97 5.01 5.08 -4.03 
(0.0002) 
LIQ 47.98 39.34 81.61 68.81 2.64 
(0.0107) 
ROE 24.34 83.09 10.64 15.33 -1.09 
(0.2790) 
ROA 4.45 5.05 2.87 15.02 -0.61 
(0.5450) 
PE 26.20 4.83 39.33 13.98 0.89 
(0.3844) 
M/B 1.75 1.66 1.65 3.03 -0.13 
(0.8940) 
Leverage 3.09 9.33 0.50 0.60 -1.78 
(0.0830) 
Total debt/ 4.43 2.04 1.11 0.24 -1.62 
Total capital (0.1130) 
In(asset) 19.36 1.47 18.69 1.37 -2.13 
(0.0362) 
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Table 2 Panel C: Mean and T-test for Differences in Mean Values between 
Foreign-acquired Firms and Non-foreign-acquired Firms during pre-Crisis 
We define pre-crisis period as Jan 1993 through Dec 1996. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of 
percentage is measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. Leverage is measured 
by the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. All financial data are for the fiscal year 
end of 1997. The last column reports t-test for differences in mean values between 
these two groups of firms. The t-statistics are computed to test the null hypothesis that 
the mean values for foreign-acquired firms and non-foreign-acquired firms are equal 
under the assumption of unequal variances. P-values are in parentheses. 
Foreign-acquired firms Non-foreign-acquired firms 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T-statistics 
Sales growth 12.94 40.71 30.13 127.15 1.85 
(0.0764) 
Cap/assets 9.11 8.57 8.93 8.94 -0.10 
(0.9226) 
LIQ 105.52 103.92 86.00 154.85 -1.25 
(0.2171) 
ROE 10.63 12.72 6.92 122.73 -1.19 
(0.2346) 
ROA 1.00 93.83 8.19 10.24 0.55 
(0.5832) 
PE 63.43 16.43 39.74 6.26 -1.35 
(0.1850) 
M/B 3.57 3.89 2.61 10.56 -0.87 
(0.3980) 
Leverage 0.55 0.90 0.61 16.66 0.17 
(0.8684) 
Total debt/ 1.17 0.18 0.97 0.73 -0.26 
Total capital (0.7951) 
In(asset) 17.93 1.93 19.00 1.52 3.80 
(0.0004) 
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Table 3: The Financial Characteristics of Domestic Firms Acquired by Foreign 
Firms 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998. All financial data are one year prior to 
the acquisition announcement date. Liquidity is measured by the ratio of net sales to 
total assets. Leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total capital, D98 
is the dummy for year 1998. All regression models include country fixed effects, year 
fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit SIC codes. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts ***，** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Pseudo 
used in logistic regression serves as analog to for ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LIQ 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0021 
(0.36) (0.72) (-1.03) (-0.90) 
LIQ*D98 -0.0120*** -0.0108** -0.0176*** -0.0175*** 
(-2.80) (-2.43) (-2.65) (-2.89) 
















Constant -4.7528*** -4.8531*** -6.0174*** -6.6257*** 
(-4.20) (-4.36) (-4.13) (-4.67) 
a The coefficient is positive but too small, and is less than 0.0001 after being rounded up to four 
decimal. 
b The coefficient is between -0.0001 and 0 after being rounded up to four decimal. 
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Model Chi-square 207.07*** 208.70*** 135.05*** 136.21*** 
OBS 7154 7647 8559 7398 
PseudoR八2 0.1332 0.1245 0.0974 0.1048 
Table 3 Con't: The Financial Characteristics of Domestic Firms Acquired by 
Foreign Firms 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
LIQ 0.0009*** -0.0012 -0.0013 >-0.000 P 
(3.56) (-0.75) (-0.90) (-0.18) 
LIQ*D98 -0.0112 -0.0106 -0.0089 -0.0096* 













Total debt/ -0.0003 
Total equity (-1.04) 
Total debt/ -0.0002 
Total equity (-0.17) 
*D98 
Constant -4.6965*** -4.9525*** -6.3551*** -5.6132*** 
(-5.14) (-4.96) (-4.45) (-4.82) 
Model 162.53*** 151.51*** 183.88*** 193.49*** 
Chi-square 
OBS 8258 8301 8923 8985 
Pseudo 0.1336 0.1470 0.1291 0.1266 
a T h e c o e f f i c i e n t is b e t w e e n - 0 . 0 0 0 1 a n d 0 a f t e r b e i n g r o u n d e d u p t o f o u r d e c i m a l . 
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Table 4: The Financial Characteristics of Domestic Firms Acquired by Foreign 
Firms during the Crisis Year of 1998 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998. All financial data are one year prior to 
the acquisition announcement date. Liquidity is measured by the ratio of net sales to 
total assets. Leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. All 
regression models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit 
SIC codes. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts 
***** 肌d * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Pseudo R'^ 2 used in logistic regression serves as analog to for 
ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a foreign 
Variables firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) — 
LIQ -0.0163*** -0.0137** -0.0217*** -0.0224*** -0.0201*** -0.01890*** 
(-2.81) (-2.43) (-2.83) (-2.97) (-2.83) (-2.63) 
ROE 0.0258*** 0.0240*** 
(3.61) (4.78) 




Sales 0.0025 0.0040* 0.0031** 
growth (1.63) (1.72) (2.36) 
In(Assets) 0.5420*** 0.5967*** 
(3.60) (4.04) 
Leverage -0.0013 >-0.000” 
(-0.62) (-0.00) 
Constant -3.7395*** -4.3361*** -4.1023*** -3.8818*** -5.1718*** -5.5533*** 
(-3.23) (-3.79) (-3.96) (-2.68) (-4.14) (-4.31) 
Model 51.65*** 49.47*** 37.43*** 34.90*** 80.54*** 54.64*** 
Chi-square 
OBS 717 723 639 631 623 628 
Pseudo RA2 0.2787 0.2101 0.2219 0.2189 0.3508 0.2882 
a T h e c o e f f i c i e n t i s b e t w e e n - 0 . 0 0 0 1 a n d 0 a f t e r b e i n g r o u n d e d u p t o f o u r d e c i m a l . 
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Table 5: The Financial Characteristics of Domestic Firms Acquired by Other 
Domestic Firms 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998. All financial data are one year prior to 
the acquisition announcement date. Liquidity is measured by the ratio of net sales to 
total assets. Leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. D98 
is the dummy for year 1998. All regression models include country fixed effects, year 
fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit SIC codes. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Pseudo 
used in logistic regression serves as analog to for ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables domestic firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LIQ 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
(0.95) (0.99) (-0.46) (-0.42) 
LIQ*D98 0.0039** 0.0036** -0.0027 -0.0008 
(2.12) (1.98) (-0.62) (-0.19) 
















Constant -3.1630*** -2.9734*** -4.3421*** -4.2196*** 
(-6.84) (-6.54) (-6.79) (-6.18) 
a The coefficient is positive but too small, and is less than 0.0001 after being rounded up to four 
decimal. 
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Model Chi-square 225.54*** 214.94*** 140.29*** 120.19*** 
OBS 7154 7647 8559 7398 
Pseudo RA2 0.0794 0.0787 0.0503 0.0504 
Table 5 Con，t: 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables domestic firm 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
LIQ 0.0003 0.0004 >-0.0001" >-0.0001' 
(1.10) (1.45) (-0.74) (-0.74) 
LIQ*D98 0.0029* 0.0025 0.0042** 0.0049*** 













Total debt/ -0.0001 
Total equity (-0.47) 
Total debt/ -0.0165 
Total equity (-1.52) 
*D98 
Constant -3.7098*** -4.7391*** -4.2754*** -4.0038*** 
(-5.87) (-5.77) (-7.76) (-7.86) 
Model 157.11 … 128.83*** 177.97… 211.33*** 
Chi-square 
OBS 8258 8301 8923 8985 
Pseudo 0.0851 0.0672 0.0685 0.0781 
a T h e c o e f f i c i e n t i s b e t w e e n - 0 . 0 0 0 1 a n d 0 a f t e r b e i n g r o u n d e d u p t o f o u r d e c i m a l . 
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Table 6: Summery Statistics on Ownership Variables 
Panel A during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998. Separation is the difference between 
control rights and cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder. A separation 
dummy is set to one if the difference between control rights and cash flow rights is 
high than zero and otherwise, zero. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of percentage is 
measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. All mean values are in terms of 
percentage. All ownership data are for the fiscal year end of 1996.The last column 
reports t-statistics for differences in mean values between these two groups of firms. 
The t-statistics are computed to test the null hypothesis that the mean values for 
foreign-acquired firms and non-foreign-acquired firms are equal under the assumption 
of unequal variances. P-values are in parentheses. 
Foreign-acquired Non-foreign-acquired 
firms firms 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T-statistics 
Control rights 24.18 12.29 29.72 13.04 2.30 
(0.0292) 
Cash flow rights 21.07 11.74 25.55 13.08 1.94 
(0.0622) 
Separation 3.11 5.15 4.17 7.53 1.03 
(0.3108) 
Ownership held by the largest 23.79 14.91 30.21 18.04 2.02 
shareholder (0.0546) 
Ownership by the largest 23.79 14.91 28.94 17.45 1.59 
shareholder affiliated with (0.1234) 
management 
LIQ*Control 975.56 643.61 2089.58 2078.78 6.11 
(0.0000) 
LIQ*Sepamtion 41.36 128.60 285.88 671.60 5.61 
(0.0000) 
LIQ*Separation dummy 3.05 8.69 20.39 37.78 6.38 
(0.0000) 
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Table 6: Summery Statistics on Ownership Variables 
Panel B during pre-Crisis 
The pre-crisis period is defined as the year of 1997. Separation is the difference 
between control rights and cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder. A 
separation dummy is set to one if the difference between control rights and cash flow 
rights is high than zero and otherwise, zero. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of percentage is 
measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. All mean values are in terms of 
percentage. All ownership data are for the fiscal year end of 1996. The last column 
reports t-statistics for differences in mean values between these two groups of firms. 
The t-statistics are computed to test the null hypothesis that the mean values for 
foreign-acquired firms and non-foreign-acquired firms are equal under the assumption 
of unequal variances. P-values are in parentheses. 
Foreign-acquired Non-foreign-acquired 
firms firms 
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T-statistics 
Control rights 32.15 12.03 29.57 13.04 -0.7663 
(0.4577) 
Cashflow rights 28.00 12.29 25.45 13.06 -0.7426 
(0.4715) 
Separation 4.15 6.74 4.13 7.48 -0.0148 
(0.9884) 
Ownership held by the large 32.15 12.03 30.27 17.86 -0.5554 
shareholder (0.5881) 
Ownership by the largest 32.15 12.03 29.08 17.11 -0.8909 
shareholder affiliated with (0.3884) 
management 
LIQ*Control 3290.74 3164.91 2249.86 2170.53 -1.08 
(0.3029) 
LIQ*Separation 457.99 945.53 338.72 792.29 -0.42 
(0.6866) 
LIQ^Separation dummy 31.16 62.93 23.59 42.40 -0.40 
(0.6995) 
9 1 
Table 7: The Effects of Ownership Structures on the Probability of Foreign 
Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998, in which there was a surge in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Separation is the difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights. A separation dummy is set to one if control rights are 
larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. A management dummy is equal to 
one if the controlling shareholder is affiliated with management and zero otherwise. 
All regression models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit 
SIC codes. Financial data are one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date while ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Superscripts ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Pseudo used in logistic regression serves as analog to for 
ordinary linear regression. 
Panel A: Size and leverage as control variables 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) _ 
Control rights -0.0685*** 
(-2.60) 
Cash flow rights -0.0398* 
(-1.81) 
Separation -0.0862 -0.0999* 
(-1.51) (-1.68) 
Separation dummy -0.0154** 
(-2.26) 
In(Asset) 0.2853 0.3217* 0.3105* 0.2115 0.3272* 
(1.38) (1.74) (1.90) (1.34) (1.94) 
Leverage -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0061 -0.0096 
(-0.90) (-0.87) (-0.56) (-0.40) 
Constant -0.6205 -1.6498 -2.8402** -3.0955** -2.S525** 
(-0.40) (-1.12) (-2.14) (-2.26) (-2.12) 
Model Chi-square 52.76*** 42.30*** 40.32*** 44.05*** 39.62*** 
OBS 411 411 411 414 411 
Pseudo 0.2430 0.2119 0.2092 0.1972 0.2209 
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Table 7 Panel A cont: 
Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is 
acquired by a foreign firm 
Independent Variables (6) (1) ^ ^ 
Management dummy -0.0116* 
(-1.78) 
Ownership by shareholders -0.0412* 
affiliated with management (-1.82) 
Pyramid -0.0082 -0.0095 
(-1.25) (-1.48) 
In(Asset) 0.3033* 0.7915*** 0.3432** 0.2391 
(1.89) (3.53) (2.08) (1.52) 
Leverage -0.0056 -0.0018 -0.0068 
(-0.36) (-0.90) (-0.47) 
Constant -1.9684 -2.2352* -2.8795** -3.1445** 
(-1.39) (-1.70) (-2.18) (-2.31) 
Model Chi-square 44.52*** 42.14*** 36.54*** 43.19*** 
OBS 411 235 411 414 
Pseudo RA2 0.2184 0.2531 0.2010 0.1869 
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Table 7: The Effects of Ownership Structures on the Probability of Foreign 
Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998, in which there was a surge in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Separation is the difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights. A separation dummy is set to one if control rights are 
larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. A management dummy is equal to 
one if the controlling shareholder is affiliated with management and zero otherwise. 
All regression models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit 
SIC codes. Financial data are one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date while ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Superscripts ***，** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Pseudo used in logistic regression serves as analog to for 
ordinary linear regression. 
Panel B: Liquidity and ROE as control variables 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is 
Variables acquired by a foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ‘ 
Control rights -0.0586** 
(-2.48) 
Cash flow -0.0323 
rights (-1.50) 




LIQ -0.0176* -0.0195** -0.0199*** -0.0204*** 
(-1.95) (-2.27) (-2.65) (-2.70) 
ROE 0.0254*** 0.0227*** 0.0269* 0.0221*** 0.0257*** 
(3.11) (2.66) (4.13) (3.36) (4.17) 
Constant -1.2927 -2.2054* -2.7451** -3.4194*** -2.6148** 
(-0.99) (-1.84) (-2.26) (-2.69) (-2.11) 
Model 57.45*** 44.55*** 52.38*** 46.77*** 55.7*** 
Chi-square 
OBS 404 404 404 404 404 
Pseudo 0.2826 0.2574 0.2674 0.2277 0.2775 
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Table 7 Panel B cont; 
Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is 
acquired by a foreign firm 
Independent Variables (6) g ) ^ ^ 
Management dummy -0.0189*** 
(-2.72) 
Ownership by -0.0550** 
shareholders affiliated (-2.24) 
with management 
Pyramid -0.0111 -0.0098 
(-1.58) (-1.49) 
LIQ -0.0206** -0.0221 • • -0.0205*** 
(-2.53) (-2.15) (-2.63) 
ROE 0.0284*** 0.0568*** 0.0249*** 0.0214*** 
(3.07) (3.51) (3.65) (3.59) 
Constant -1.6145 -0.8761 -2.7354** -3.0333** 
(4.48) (-0.50) (-2.30) (-2.20) 
Model Chi-square 43.56*** 38.89*** 45.84*** 45.72*** 
OBS 404 289 404 404 
Pseudo RA2 0.3115 0.3032 0.2613 0.2189 
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Table 7: The Effects of Ownership Structures on the Probability of Foreign 
Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998, in which there was a surge in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Separation is the difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights. A separation dummy is set to one if control rights are 
larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. A management dummy is equal to 
one if the controlling shareholder is affiliated with management and zero otherwise. 
All regression models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit 
SIC codes. Financial data are one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date while ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Superscripts ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Pseudo used in logistic regression serves as analog to for 
ordinary linear regression. 
Panel C: Robustness checks 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control rights -0.0744* * * 
(-2.91) 






LIQ -0.0141* -0.0170** -0.0168** -0.0174** 
(-1.84) (-2.20) (-2.13) (-2.17) 
ROE 0.0336*** 0.0296*** 0.0294*** 0.0294* •• 
(3.48) (3.16) (3.95) (3.96) 
In(Asset) 0.2787 0.2913* 0.2130 0.2340 
(1.45) (1.68) (1.15) (1.23) 
Leverage -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0047 -0.0112 
(-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.38) 
Constant 0.2597 -0.4828 -2.1378 -2.1446 
(0.16) (-0.31) (-1.49) (-1.48) 
Model Chi-square 57.71*** 49.61*** 56.98*** 57.23*** 
OBS 401 401 401 401 
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Pseudo 0.3195 0.2929 0.2751 0.2864 
Table 7 Panel C cont; 
Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is 
acquired by a foreign firm 
Independent Variables (5) ^ ^ ^ 
Management dummy -0.0157** 
(-2.08) 
Ownership by shareholders -0.0725** 
affiliated with management (-2.22) 
Pyramid -0.00913 -0.0110 
(-1.31) (-1.58) 
LIQ -0.0193** -0.0150 -0.0175** -0.0194** 
(-2.06) (-1.34) (-2.15) (-2.29) 
ROE 0.0325*** 0.0597*** 0.0293*** 0.0265*** 
(3.22) (2.91) (3.80) (4.01) 
In(Asset) 0.2121 0.7611*** 0.2607 0.1503 
(1.16) (3.30) (1.38) (0.94) 
Leverage -0.0070 0.0047 -0.0091 
(-0.23) (1.15) (-0.32) 
Constant -0.6382 -0.9595 -2.1019 -2.2022 
(-0.38) (-0.54) (-1.48) (-1.54) 
Model Chi-square 39.09*** 52.70*** 45.28*** 48.28*** 
OBS 401 233 401 404 
Pseudo RA2 0.3081 0.3435 0.2746 0.2656 
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Table 8 Panel A: The Interaction of Liquidity and Corporate Governance 
Variables on Foreign Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998，in which there was a surge in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of percentage is 
measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. Separation is the difference between 
control rights and cash flow rights. All regression models include country fixed 
effects and industry dummy for two-digit SIC codes. Financial data are one year 
(1997) prior to the acquisition announcement date while ownership data are the most 
recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts ***，** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Pseudo 
used in logistic regression serves as analog to for ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 6 ) — 
LIQ*Control -0.0008*** -0.0008** -0.0008*** 
(-2.95) (-2.28) (-2.58) 
LIQ*Separation -0.0028** -0.0025* -0.0023* 
(-2.08) (-1.94) (-1.80) 
In(Assets) 0.1459 0.2088 0.3069* 0.3205* 
(0.67) (1.13) (1.84) (1.87) 
Leverage -0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0062 -0.0107 
(-1.16) (-0.21) (-0.54) (-0.37) 
ROE 0.0306*** 0.0249*** 
(3.02) (3.08) 
Constant -2.8120*** -2.8903*** -2.8413*** -3.1824*** -3.2722*** -3.4944*** 
(-2.60) (-2.58) (-2.58) (-2.75) (-2.79) (-2.77) 
Model 51.78*** 56.40*** 50.69*** 46.30*** 45.10*** 47.29*** 
Chi-Square 
OBS 414 411 401 414 411 401 
Pseudo RA2 0.2350 0.2433 0.3073 0.2037 0.2240 0.2649 
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Table 8 Panel B: The Interaction of a Liquidity Variable and a Dummy of 
Separation on Foreign Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998，in which there was a surge in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of percentage is 
measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. A separation dummy is set to one if 
control rights are larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. All regression 
models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit SIC codes. 
Financial data are one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement date while 
ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts ***,** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Pseudo used in logistic regression serves as analog to for ordinary linear 
regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 一 
LIQ -0.0140* -0.0141* 
(-1.73) (-1.72) 
Separation 0.0063 -0.0003 
Dummy (0.55) (-0.036) 
LIQ*Separation -0.0441*** -0.0417*** -0.0386*** -0.0399** -0.0528** -0.0391* 
dummy (-3.17) (-3.06) (-2.84) (-2.54) (-2.15) (-1.64) 
In(Assets) 0.3216* 0.3425* 0.2525 0.3416* 0.2521 
(1.86) (1.95) (1.30) (1.92) (1.29) 
Leverage -0.0084 -0.0145 -0.0086 -0.0118 -0.0087 
(-0.41) (-0.50) (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.30) 
ROE 0.0245*** 0.0267*** 0.0239*** 0.0268*** 
(2.99) (3.67) (3.01) (3.68) 
Constant -3.1218*** -3.2039*** -3.4443*** -2.9505** -3.4938*** -2.9463** 
(-2.62) (-2.62) (-2.65) (-2.35) (-2.68) (-2.31) 
Model 45.82*** 44.69* •• 48.97*** 57.83*** 51.50*** 60.49*** 
Chi-Square 
OBS 414 411 401 401 401 401 
Pseudo RA2 0.2143 0.2367 0.2756 0.2925 0.2766 0.2925 
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Table 9 Panel A: The Effects of Ownership Structures on the Probability of 
Foreign Acquisitions during pre-Crisis 
The pre-crisis period is defined as the year of 1997. Separation is the difference 
between control rights and cash flow rights. A separation dummy is set to one if 
control rights are larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. A management 
dummy is equal to one if the controlling shareholder is affiliated with management 
and zero otherwise. All regression models include country fixed effects and industry 
dummy for two-digit SIC codes. Financial data are one year (1996) prior to the 
acquisition announcement date while ownership data are the most recent year (1996) 
prior to the acquisition announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Superscripts ***，** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. Pseudo 尺八2 used in logistic regression serves as 
analog to for ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ~ 
Control -0.0113 
rights (-0.36) 










LIQ -0.0043 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0043 -0.0045 
(-0.44) (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.42) (-0.46) 
ROE -0.0090 -0.0086 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0097 -0.0085 
(-1.48) (-1.46) (-1.49) (-1.35) (-1.54) (-1.49) 
In(Asset) 0.3243 0.3149 0.3053 0.3004 0.3197 0.2988 
(1.57) (1.57) (1.52) (1.52) (1.59) (1.51) 
Leverage -1.2421*** -1.2322** -1.1949*** -1.1818*** -1.1968** -1.1776*** 
(-2.60) (-2.51) (-2.73) (-2.71) (-2.55) (-2.71) 
Constant -1.2318 -1.2365 -1.5662 -1.5961 -2.1315 -1.6186 
100 
(-0.84) (-0.89) (-1.40) (-1.35) (-1.22) (-1.35) 
Model 53.42***”49.82*** 50.93***”49.79***”51.4***“50.54*** 
Chi-square 
OBS 323 323 323 323 323 323 
Pseudo 0.1042 0.1046 0.1024 0.1030 0.1108 0.1034 
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Table 9 Panel B: The Interaction of Liquidity and Corporate Governance 
Variables on Foreign Acquisitions during pre-Crisis 
The pre-crisis period is defined as the year of 1997. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of 
percentage is measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. Separation is the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights. All regression models include 
country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit SIC codes. Financial data are 
one year (1996) prior to the acquisition announcement date while ownership data are 
the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts ***，** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Pseudo 
used in logistic regression serves as analog to for ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LIQ*Control 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.90) (-0.56) (-0.69) 
LIQ* Separation 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 
(0.66) (0.90) (0.72) 
In(Assets) 0.3149 0.3205* 0.2636 0.2757 
(1.63) (1.65) (1.18) (1.29) 
Leverage -0.9930* -1.2219*** -0.8236** -1.0825*** 
(-1.92) (-2.69) (-2.23) (-2.83) 
ROE -0.0088 -0.0059 
(-1.51) (-1.22) 
Constant -2.3545** -1.8298** -1,5865 -2.1092** -2.0293** -1.8215** 
(-2.45) (-1.96) (-1.62) (-2.46) (-236) (-2.03) 
Model 18.05* 51.79*** 45.51*** 18.44** 48.17*** 45.50*** 
Chi-Square 
OBS 360 354 323 360 354 323 
Pseudo RA2 0.1161 0.0957 0.1038 0.1099 0.1005 0.1042 
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Table 9 Panel C: The Interaction of Liquidity and a Dummy of Separation on 
Foreign Acquisitions during pre-Crisis 
The pre-crisis period is defined as the year of 1997. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of 
percentage is measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. A separation dummy is 
set to one if control rights are larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. All 
regression models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit 
SIC codes. Financial data are one year (1996) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date while ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Superscripts ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Pseudo used in logistic regression serves as analog to for 
ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables foreign firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 一 
LIQ -0.0140 -0.0271 
(-1.16) (-1.24) 
Separation -0.0148 -0.0264 
dummy (-0.86) (-1.44) 
LIQ*Separation 0.0053 0.0096 0.0084 0.0155 0.0183 0.0414 
dummy (0.72) (1.16) (1.00) (1.30) (1.37) (1.57) 
In(Assets) 0.2806 0.2802 0.2368 0.3156 0.2345 
(1.15) (1.22) (1.01) (1.39) (0.98) 
Leverage -0.8543** -1.0619*** -1.1734*** -1.1653*** -1.3614*** 
(-2.45) (-2.95) (-2.99) (-3.06) (-3.18) 
ROE -0.0045 -0.0050 -0.0051 -0.0064 
(-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.99) (-1.14) 
Constant -2.1299** -2.0508** -1.8532** -1.1799 -1.5703 -0.2649 
(-2.45) (-2.37) (-2.06) (-1.16) (-1.62) (-0.21) 
Model 17.51* 47.96*** 43.42*** 47.91*** 41.01*** 43.29*** 
Chi-Square 
OBS 360 354 323 323 323 323 
Pseudo 0.1125 0.1130 0.1146 0.1340 0.1286 0.1730 
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Table 10 Panel A: The Effects of Ownership Structures on the Probability of 
Domestic Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998. Separation is the difference between 
control rights and cash flow rights. A separation dummy is set to one if control rights 
are larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. A management dummy is equal to 
one if the controlling shareholder is affiliated with management and zero otherwise. 
All regression models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit 
SIC codes. Financial data are one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date while ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Superscripts ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Pseudo used in logistic regression serves as analog to for 
ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables domestic firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) “ 
Control -0.0083 
rights (-0.22) 










LIQ 0.0085** 0.0082* 0.0083** 0.0083** 0.0083** 0.0082** 
(1.99) (1.94) (2.21) (2.17) (2.26) (2.15) 
ROE 0.0061 0.0056 0.0059 0.0059 0.0056 0.0057 
(1.29) (1.27) (1.04) (0.96) (1.07) (1.01) 
In(Asset) 0.2255 0.2366 0.2412 0.2570 0.2346 0.2550 
(0.87) (0.88) (0.87) (0.94) (0.87) (0.91) 
Leverage -0.0612** -0.0611** -0.0619** -0.0618** -0.0595* -0.0620** 
(-2.19) (-2.24) (-2.23) (-2.23) (-1.89) (-2.245) 
Constant -3.5834** -3.9667*** -3.8082*** -3.8006*** -4.0085*** -3.7905*** 
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(-2.55) (-2.65) (-3.73) (-3.71) (-4.41) (-3.68) 
Model 61.97*** 62.13*** 39.35*** 36.77*** 41.09*** 40.16*** 
Chi-square 
OBS 416 416 416 416 416 416 
Pseudo RA2 0.1249 0.1243 0.1276 0.1326 0.1247 0.1301 
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Table 10 Panel B: The Interaction of Liquidity and Corporate Governance 
Variables on Domestic Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of 
percentage is measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. Separation is the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights. All regression models include 
country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit SIC codes. Financial data are 
one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement date while ownership data are 
the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts ** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Pseudo 
RA2 used in logistic regression serves as analog to for ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables domestic firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LIQ*Control~0.0002* 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
(1.92) (2.95) (2.82) 
LIQ*Separation >-0.0001^ 0.0001 <0.0001" 
(-0.05) (0.29) (0.19) 
In(Assets) 0.2745 0.2418 0.2021 0.1944 
(0.97) (0.85) (0.80) (0.77) 
Leverage -0.0512** -0.0581** -0.0441* -0.0582** 
(-2.07) (-2.24) (-1.70) (-2.24) 
ROE 0.0047 0.0081 
(1.06) (1.24) 
Constant -3.8289*** -4.0182*** -3.8464*** -3.3532*** -3.3984*** -3.2266*** 
(-4.15) (-3.79) (-3.71) (-2.98) (-2.82) (-2.73) 
Model 47.83*** 49.08*** 53.8*** 24.76** 31.11*** 46.30*** 
Chi-Square 
OBS 444 427 416 444 427 416 
Pseudo 0.1136 0.1125 0.1184 0.0915 0.0707 0.0817 
a The coefficient is between -0.0001 and 0 after being rounded up to four decimal. 
b The coefficient is positive but too small, and is less than 0.0001 after being rounded up to four 
decimal. 
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Table 10 Panel C: The Interaction of Liquidity and a Dummy of Separation on 
Domestic Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms of 
percentage is measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. A separation dummy is 
set to one if control rights are larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. All 
regression models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit 
SIC codes. Financial data are one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date while ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Superscripts ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Pseudo used in logistic regression serves as analog to R八2 for 
ordinary linear regression. 
Independent Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
Variables domestic firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 6 ) — 
LIQ 0.0085** 0.0076* 
(2.29) (1.92) 
Separation -0.0205 -0.0157 
dummy (-1.50) (-1.10) 
LIQ*Separation -0.0007 0.0014 0.0008 -0.0025 0.0162 0.0092 
dummy (-0.08) (0.13) (0.07) (-0.26) (1.21) (0.64) 
In(assets) 0.2027 0.1950 0.2394 0.2016 0.2568 
(0.80) (0.77) (0.87) (0.78) (0.92) 
Leverage -0.0443* -0.0584** -0.0614** -0.0598** -0.0615** 
(-1.71) (-2.26) (-2.20) (-2.36) (-2.26) 
ROE 0.0082 0.0059 0.0080 0.0053 
(1.23) (1.02) (0.94) (0.79) 
Constant -3.3558*** -3.3946*** -3.2247*** -3.8902*** -3.0156*** -3.6172*** 
(-2.97) (-2.80) (-2.72) (-3.76) (-2.65) (-3.85) 
Model 24.74** 31.47*** 46.45*** 37.35*** 47.91*** 40.19*** 
Chi-Square 
OBS 444 427 416 416 416 416 
Pseudo RA2 0.0916 0.0704 0.0815 0.1253 0.1059 0.1377 
1 0 7 
Table 11: Multinomial Logistic Regression 
The crisis period is defined as the year of 1998, in which there was a surge in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Separation is the difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights. A separation dummy is set to one if control rights are 
larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. A management dummy is equal to 
one if the controlling shareholder is affiliated with management and zero otherwise. 
All regression models include country fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit 
SIC codes. Financial data are one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date while ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition 
announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Superscripts ***，** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Pseudo R八2 used in logistic regression serves as analog to R'^2 for 
ordinary linear regression. 
Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is a non-target 
(1) 丨(2) 1(3) — 
Independent Foreign Domestic [Foreign Domestic 1 Foreign Domestic 
Variables Acquisition Acquisition J Acquisition Acquisition I Acquisition Acquisition 
Targets Targets | Targets Targets (Targets Targets 
Control -0.0538** - 0 . 0 3 3 9 ~ 1 
rights (-2.18) (-1.14) I 
Cash flow -0.0289 -0.0223 I 
rights (-1.27) (-0.78) 
Separation -0.1187* -0.0227 
(-1.67) (-0.48) 
LIQ -0.0187* 0.0087** -0.0202** 0.0082** 1-0.0203** 0.0075** 
(-1.82) (2.25) (-1.99) (2.13) (-2.07) (2.04) 
ROE 0.0257*** 0.0080 0.0233** 0.0075 |o.0274*** 0.0065 
(2.60) (0.74) (2.46) (0.71) (2.60) (0.65) 
Constant -0.3033 -2.7282* -1.0796 -3.0838** -2,0844* -3.6950*** 
(-0.22) (-1.80) (-0.79) (-2.08) (-1.72) (-2.88) 
Model 67.24*** 63.13*** 65.11*** 
Chi-square 丨 | 
OBS 490 490 490 
Pseudo RA2 0.2599 [o.2440 j0.2517 
1 0 8 
Table 11 cont: Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is a non-target 
(4) 1(5) 1(6) 一 
Independent Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic 
Variables Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition 
Targets Targets Targets Targets Targets Targets 
Separation -0.0187** -0.0031 
dummy (-2.06) (-0.42) 
Management -0.0199*** 0.0029 
dummy (-3.02) (0.35) 
Pyramid -0.0122 -0.0077 
(-1.60) (-0.93) 
LIQ -0.0207** 0.0074** -0.0212** 0.0075** -0.0209** 0.0073** 
(-2.11) (2.00) (-2.14) (2.01) (-2.14) (1.97) 
ROE 0.0262** 0.0064 0.0295*** 0.0063 0.0254*** 0.0063 
(2.55) (0.64) (2.87) (0.63) (2.66) (0.63) 
Constant -2.1028* -3.6967*** -0.2767 -3.9547*** -2.0186* -3.6658*** 
(-1.73) (-2.89) (-0.21) (-2.76) (-1.69) (-2.85) 
Model 66.76*** 72.07*** 64.81*** 
Chi-square 
OBS 490 490 490 
Pseudo R八2 0.2580 0.2786 0.2505 
1 0 9 
Table 12: The Effects of Ownership Structures on the Probability of Foreign 
Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as November 1997 through December 1998, in which 
there was a surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Separation is the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights. A separation dummy is set to 
one if control rights are larger than cash flow rights and zero otherwise. A 
management dummy is equal to one if the controlling shareholder is affiliated with 
management and zero otherwise. All regression models include country fixed effects, 
year fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit SIC codes. Financial data are one 
year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement date while ownership data are the 
most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts ***,** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Pseudo 
used in logistic regression serves as analog to for ordinary linear regression. 
Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
foreign firm 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables 
Control rights -0.0691*** 
(-3.22) 
Cash flow -0.0431** 
rights (-2.19) 




In(asset) 0.2702 0.2978 0.2698* 0.1874 0.2822* 
(1.32) (1.56) (1.64) (1.21) (1.72) 
Leverage -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0048 
(-0.97) (-0.96) (-1.23) (-1.34) 
Constant -2.8459* -3.7623*** -4.9974*** -5.2740*** -5.0173*** 
(-1.90) (-2.57) (-3.61) (-3.69) (-3.59) 
Model 74.17*** 77.83*** 81.95*** 84.81*** 74.39*** 
Chi-square 
OBS 801 801 801 804 801 
Pseudo RA2 0.2796 0.2493 0.2435 0.2354 0.2539 
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Table 12 Panel cont 
Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is 
acquired by a foreign firm 
Independent Variables (6) 0 ) ^ ^ 
Management dummy -0.0103* 
(-1.64) 
Ownership by -0.0413** 
shareholders affiliated (-2.16) 
with management 
Pyramid -0.0091 -0.0102* 
(-1.44) (-1.67) 
In(Asset) 0.2665 0.4825*** 0.3016* 0.2164 
(1.62) (2.67) (1.85) (1.41) 
Leverage -0.0032 0.0004 -0.0042 
(-0.98) (0.18) (-1.27) 
Constant -4.5368*** -1.8325 -5.0303*** -5.3112*** 
(-3.46) (-1.45) (-3.64) (-3.71) 
Model Chi-square 84.89*** 43.86*** 96.23*** 100.87*** 
OBS 801 327 801 804 
Pseudo RA2 0.2323 0.1679 0.2355 0.2260 
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Table 13 Panel A: The Interaction of Liquidity and Corporate Governance 
Variables on Foreign Acquisitions during the Crisis 
The crisis period is defined as November 1997 through December 1998，in which 
there was a surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Liquidity (LIQ) in terms 
of percentage is measured by the ratio of net sales to total assets. Separation is the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights. All regression models include 
country fixed effects, year fixed effects and industry dummy for two-digit SIC codes. 
Financial data are one year (1997) prior to the acquisition announcement date while 
ownership data are the most recent year (1996) prior to the acquisition announcement 
date. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. Superscripts ***，** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Pseudo RA2 used in logistic regression serves as analog to for ordinary linear 
regression. 
Dependent variable equals one if a domestic firms is acquired by a 
foreign firm 
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
LIQ*Control -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0007* • 
(-2.45) (-2.14) (-2.35) 
LIQ*Separation -0.0030* -0.0027* -0.0024* 
(-1.94) (-1.80) (-1.73) 
In(assets) 0.1406 0.1851 0.2669 0.2707* 
(0.73) (1.12) (1.60) (1.66) 
Leverage -0.0029 -0.0015 -0.0041 -0.0095 
(-1.32) (-0.26) (-1.23) (-0.34) 
ROE 0.0296*** 0.0237*** 
(3.05) (3.16) 
Constant -4.8770*** -4.9385*** -5.1475*** -5.1864*** -5.2556*** -5.6149*** 
(-4.08) (-3.99) (-4.15) (-3.97) (-3.93) (-4.10) 
Model 63.46* 79.99*** 67.18*** 73.33*** 84.5*** 86.34*** 
Chi-Square 
OBS 804 801 747 804 801 747 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure l:The Deal Values of M&A in the Five Crisis-hit 
Countries,(US$ Billions) 1993-2002 
cross border M&A 
domestic M&A 
30 r — — ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ — — — — — — 
Q -J —___I J 1 I -J I 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
year 
SDC reports deal values of both cross-border and domestic M&A. 
Figure 1 reports the transaction values of completed deals. 
UNCTAD (2000) reports different figures for cross-border M&A by countries, but 
shows similar trends. 
115 
Appendix 1 
Source of Data and Data Used in Regressions 
Data Sources 
Financial Data SDC & Worldscope 2003^ 
Worldscope 1997&1998 
Ownership Data Worldscope 1997，1998& 1999 
Asian Handbook 1999 
Claessens et aL(20Q0) 
Financial and Ownership Data Used in Regressions are One Year prior to the 
Acquisition Announcement Date. 
Period Acquisition Financial Data Ownership Table 
Announcement Used Data Used 
Data 
Whole period 1993-2002 1992-2001 (dummy Table 3,5 
year D98) 
Crisis 1998 1997 1996 Table 7,8, 
10,11 
Pre-crisis 1997 1996 1996 Table 9 
a W o r l d s c o p e 2 0 0 3 c o n t a i n s m o s t o f financial d a t a f o r 1 9 9 2 - 2 0 0 1 . 
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Appendix 2 
Definition of Financial Variables in SDC 
Return on equity (ROE): Return on equity is defined as the ratio of net income to 
common equity for the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement of the 
transaction. 
Return on assets (ROA): Return on assets is defined as the ratio of net income to total 
assets for the twelve month period ending on the date of the most current financial 
information prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
Leverage: Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to shareholder's equity. 
DSER = (HOSTSTRAIGHTDEBT + HOSTCVTDEBT)/(HOSTCOMONEQUITY + 
HOSTPFDEQUITY). 
Market/book (M/B): M/B is defined as the ratio of stock price four weeks prior to 
announcement date of the transaction to book value as of the date of the most current 
financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction. 
Price/earnings (P/E): P/E is defined as the ratio of stock price four weeks prior to the 
announcement of the transaction to earnings per share for the last twelve months 
ending on the date of the most current financial information prior to the 
announcement of the transaction. 
Price/book (P/B): P/B is defined as the ratio of offering price in deal to book value per 
share as of the date of the most current financial information prior to the 
announcement of the transaction ($ per share). 
Cash flow: Cash flow is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization for the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement of the 
transaction ($mil). (EBITl + DEPNAl) 
Note: The definition of cash flow is somewhat different between Worldscope and 
SDC. Worldscope reports cash & cash equivalent while SDC reports cash flow as 
EBITDA. 
Capital Expenditures: Gross purchases of property, plant, and equipment for the most 
recent fiscal year prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). 
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Net Sales: Primary source of revenue after taking into account returned goods and 
allowances for price reductions for the last twelve months ending on the date of the 
most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). 
If not available, total revenues are used. For banks, net sales equals interest income 
plus non-interest income. 
Total assets: Total balance sheet assets including, current assets, long-term 
investments and funds, net fixed assets, intangible assets, and deferred charges, as of 
the date of the most current financial information prior to the announcement of the 




Definition of Transaction Values in SDC 
Value of Transaction ($ mil): Total value of consideration paid by the acquiror, 
excluding fees and expenses. The dollar value includes the amount paid for all 
common stock, common stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, assets, 
warrants, and stake purchases made within six months of the announcement date of 
the transaction. Liabilities assumed are included in the value if they are publicly 
disclosed. Preferred stock is only included if it is being acquired as part of a 100% 
acquisition. If a portion of the consideration paid by the acquiror is common stock, the 
stock is valued using the closing price on the last full trading day prior to the 
announcement of the terms of the stock swap. If the exchange ratio of shares offered 
changes, the stock is valued based on its closing price on the last full trading date 
prior to the date of the exchange ratio change. For public target 100% acquisitions, the 
number of shares at date of announcement (CACT) is used. 
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Appendix 4 
The Expected Effects of Financial and Ownership Variables on the Likelihood of 
Acquisitions 
Expected sign Foreign acquisitions Domestic Acquisitions 
Variables During the crisis Other periods During the crisis 
LIQ ？ + 
ROE + ？ ? 
ROA + ？ ? 
Cap/asses + ？ ? 
Sales growth + ？ ？ 
P/E + ？ 
M/B - + ？ 
Leverage - -
Control rights - ？ ? 
Cash flow rights - ？ ? 
Separation - ？ ? 
Dummy for separation - ？ ? 
Managerial ownership - ？ ? 
Dummy for management - ？ ? 
LIQ* Control - ？ ？ 
LIQ* Separation - ？ ？ 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 9 Summary Statistics on the Means of the Financial Ratios by 
Countries, Industries and Year 
The industrial classification is based on 2-digit SIC codes. Industries are defined as 
the same as those in appendix 2. Firm size is measured by the logarithm of total assets 
(in million U.S. dollars). Worldscope reports In (Asset) in both local currencies and in 
U.S. dollars. We use In (Asset) in U.S. dollars in the regressions and do not need to 
convert local currencies into one currency. 
By countries P ^ M/B S ^ 
Indonesia 70.45 20.25 1 9 ^ 
Malaysia 64.17 
Philippines 271.28 1.33 
S. Korea ^ 20.74 
Thailand 36.10 ^ 
By Industries P/E M/B ^ 
Agriculture, 59.95 9.35 18.77 
Forestry, & Fishing 
Mining m 
Construction 183.91 I M 18.76 
Manufacturing 43.86 ^ 
Transportation & 266.01 9.31 19.82 
Public Utilities 
Wholesale Trade 72.16 
Services 73.41 4.88 19.48 
Public 94.81 3.08 18.46 
Administration 
By years ^ ^ ^ ^ 
199 3 41.10 ^ 
199 4 57.54 ^ 18.12 
199 5 91.70 6.38 
199 6 100.31 ^ 
199 7 65.55 I M 
199 8 31.39 IJO 
199 9 401.10 16.24 
200 0 141.81 ^ 1 9 ^ 
200 1 24.70 19.59 
2002 16.38 I 1.82 19.23 
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